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The Misuse of Tobin’s q
Robert Bartlett and Frank Partnoy*
In recent years, scholars have addressed the most important topics in
corporate law based on a flawed assumption: that the ratio of the market value
of a corporation’s securities to their book value is a valid measure of the value
of the corporation. The topics have included staggered boards, incorporation in
Delaware, shareholder activism, dual-class share structures, share ownership,
board diversity, and other significant aspects of corporate governance.
We trace the history of this flawed assumption, and document how it
emerged from Tobin’s q, a concept from an unrelated area in macroeconomics.
We show that scholars have misused Tobin’s q, and we demonstrate empirically
why scholarly assumptions about this ratio are flawed, particularly because
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book value is error prone, which generates problems involving aggregated
assets, omitted variables, and statistical bias.
Our message for corporate law scholars is straightforward: view with
suspicion the large body of empirical law and finance scholarship that misuses
Tobin’s q. We also offer a cautionary tale for researchers more broadly: the
current replication crisis in the social sciences is potentially even more serious
than has been imagined, and there are critical questions about not only
replicability, but also about validity.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 355
I.
A HISTORY OF TOBIN’S Q ..................................................... 363
A.
The Classical Macroeconomic View: 1968–1976 ..... 363
B.
Early Interpretations from Empirical Finance:
1977–1984 ................................................................ 366
C.
The Divergence Between Macroeconomics and
Empirical Finance: 1984–1992 ................................ 369
D.
The Adoption of Simple Q as a Measure of the
Value of Corporations: 1994–Present ...................... 373
THE CASE AGAINST USING SIMPLE Q .................................. 386
II.
A.
Interpretive Error .................................................... 387
B.
Measurement Error in Simple Q ............................. 390
1.
Evidence of Measurement Error .................. 390
2.
Measurement Error and Bias ....................... 394
C.
Q and Equity Returns .............................................. 400
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL
III.
SCIENCE RESEARCH ............................................................. 405
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 411
APPENDIX A: CURRENT ASSETS AND INTANGIBLES ......................... 412
APPENDIX B: SIMPLE Q AND CUMULATIVE ANNUAL RETURNS ........ 414
APPENDIX C: BCF REPLICATION STUDY ......................................... 416

Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2020]

3/13/2020 2:12 PM

THE MISUSE OF TOBIN’S Q

355

You keep using that word. I do not think it means what
you think it means.
—Inigo Montoya, The Princess Bride1
INTRODUCTION
For several decades, scholars have assessed many of the key
concepts in corporate law by studying empirically how they impact the
value of corporations. For example, one central question in corporate
law is whether widespread incorporation in Delaware is normatively
desirable. Scholars have attempted to answer this question by studying
the association between a firm’s state of incorporation and the value of
the firm’s corporate securities, and their answers have significantly
influenced policy.2
Or consider the heated debate about the use of staggered boards
of directors at corporations. Both shareholder-friendly and
management-friendly groups have relied on empirical studies in their
advocacy either against or on behalf of companies with staggered
boards.3 These studies examine the association between the presence of
a staggered board and the value of corporate securities. The articles
published in this area have also been widely cited and influential.
The same basic story holds for many of the most important areas
of corporate law. How should we compare different countries’ corporate
law regimes?4 How should we assess corporate governance indices,

1.
THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987).
2.
See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001)
(finding that Delaware firms are worth more than firms incorporated elsewhere); Guhan
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (finding that
firms incorporated in Delaware are worth two to three percent more than non-Delaware firms
during the period 1991–1996, but not after 1996); see also Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Manns,
The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2015) (describing prior studies and employing a
merger reincorporation event study approach).
3.
See Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling the Staggered
Board Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475 (2018) (finding that a staggered board has no significant
effect on firm value); Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409 (2005) (finding that staggered boards are negatively associated with firm value); Alma
Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from
a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627 (2013) (same); K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P.
Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN.
ECON. 422 (2017) (finding that the relationship between staggered boards and firm value is
heterogeneous); Emiliano M. Catan & Michael Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm Value:
Have Shareholders and Boards Really Destroyed Billions in Value? (NYU Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-39, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2994559 [https://perma.cc/5HCD-LFTP] (same).
4.
See, e.g., Larry Fauver, Mingyi Hung, Xi Li & Alvaro Taboada, Board Reforms and Firm
Value: Worldwide Evidence, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 120 (2017) (measuring the valuation of firms to test
the effect of different countries’ legal regimes); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei
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which attempt to measure the quality of corporate governance at firms,
including various provisions in their charters and bylaws such as
takeover defenses?5 How should we assess the concentration of
ownership among board members or shareholders?6 Scholars have
attempted to answer all of these and many other important questions
in corporate law using empirical studies that assess the relationship
between changes in these factors and the value of a corporation’s
securities.7 This kind of empirical research in corporate law has
influenced scholars and policymakers in fundamental ways.
These studies, including the most influential ones, use the
econometric technique of linear regression. The basic idea is to test
whether the data show a statistically significant relationship between
some concept in corporate law (the independent variable) and the value
of a firm’s securities (the dependent variable). Of course, linear
regression is a powerful statistical technique when properly used.
Unfortunately, many of these studies do not properly use the
technique. Instead of simply testing the association between a corporate
law concept and the value of a firm’s securities, they perform a
potentially dangerous mathematical operation in the context of linear
regression: division. Specifically, they divide the key dependent
variable of interest—typically the market value of a corporation’s
securities—by the accounting construct known as the “book value” of a
firm’s assets. Book value is a record of a company’s assets and liabilities
based on accounting rules that vary in whether an asset or liability gets
recorded at historical cost, fair market value, or some other standard.
For some of the most important assets owned by a firm, accountants
record no book value at all. As we demonstrate below, dividing by book
value of assets can be fraught with peril.

Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002)
(same).
5.
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (finding that increases in a six-factor entrenchment
index are negatively associated with firm value); Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick,
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003) (finding that an improvement
in a corporate-governance index is associated with an increase in firm value).
6.
See, e.g., John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership
and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595 (1990) (finding that firm value is positively related to
the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors and curvilinearly related to insider
ownership at various levels); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management
Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988)
(describing Tobin’s q as a “proxy for market valuation of the firm’s assets” and finding that q varies
based on board equity ownership).
7.
See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang & Rene M. Stulz, Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm
Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248 (1994) (finding that firm value and diversification are
negatively related throughout the 1980s).
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Scholars have failed to account for this fundamental error, in
part because the dependent variable commonly used in the literature
has been given a sophisticated-sounding name: “Tobin’s q.”8 This
variable, which has morphed over the years from a nuanced classical
macroeconomic concept into the simple ratio of the market value of a
firm’s securities divided by the firm’s book value of assets, has become
pervasive in corporate law scholarship, even though it is a very poor
measure of the value of corporations, the thing that scholars are
purporting to study.
The story of how Tobin’s q came to be one of the most important
concepts in corporate law scholarship is untold in the literature. Yet
this variable now plays a key role in assessing how various important
regulatory and corporate governance provisions impact economic
welfare. More than three hundred law review articles, including many
of the most widely cited in corporate law, have referenced Tobin’s q as
a key measure of the value of corporations,9 as have hundreds of articles
in the most highly regarded peer-reviewed finance and economics
journals.10 The trend in citations to Tobin’s q is markedly upward.11
Recently, articles in leading law reviews have referenced Tobin’s q in
analyzing such important topics as how firm value has been affected by

8.
See James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY
CREDIT & BANKING 15, 15, 29 (1969) (laying out “a general framework for monetary analysis” in
which the variable q represents the “valuations of physical assets relative to their replacement
costs”).
9.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 900 n.150 (2005) (describing Tobin’s q as “a standard measure used by financial economists,
as a proxy for firm value”). A search for “Tobin! /2 q” in the Westlaw “Law Reviews & Journals”
database on January 30, 2020, generated 384 results. A search for “Tobin’s q” at the same time in
the Law “elibrary” of the Social Science Research Network found 4,751 papers. As we discuss, legal
scholars primarily utilize q as a proxy for firm value and firm performance. See, e.g., Michael
Klausner, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law and Governance: Some Steps Forward and Some
Steps Not, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 184, 198 n.59 (Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (“Tobin’s Q is a measure of firm value.”). All of the
studies cited supra notes 2–7 expressly used Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value.
10. In preparing this article, we conducted a search of articles referencing Tobin’s q in recent
issues of the three most cited finance journals: volumes 25–72 of the Journal of Finance, volumes
83–124 of the Journal of Financial Economics, and volumes 20–30 of the Review of Financial
Studies. We found that 445 articles in these volumes referenced Tobin’s q, with 95 articles
referencing Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value.
11. According to the Westlaw “Law Reviews & Journals” database, the average and median
annual citation rate to Tobin’s q in law reviews has been nearly ten times higher during the 2010s
than it was during the 1990s, and this rate has been increasing throughout the period 1990
through 2018.
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hedge fund activism,12 fiduciary duties,13 staggered boards,14 and
corporate governance.15
As originally conceived, Tobin’s q, named for the economist
James Tobin, was an important variable in macroeconomic theory; it
was defined as the market value of a firm’s assets divided by their
replacement value.16 However, in corporate law and related areas of
scholarship, researchers have used a very different, more simplistic
version of q, which we label “Simple q.” Simple q is essentially a version
of the “market-to-book” ratio: the market value of a firm’s capital
divided by its book value.17 Simple q is a ratio and its denominator plays
an important role in the story of the misuse of Tobin’s q in modern
corporate law scholarship.
Our goal here is to lay out for a law review audience the
historical development of the misuse of Tobin’s q in modern corporate
law scholarship and demonstrate the basic reasons why using Simple q
as a proxy for firm value is problematic. Our central point in this article
is that the scholarly use of Simple q is deeply flawed.18 As a general
12. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870
(2017) (discussing results of hedge fund activism studies based on Tobin’s q); K.J. Martijn Cremers,
Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund Activism, Firm Valuation, and Stock
Returns
(Dec.
19,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 [https://perma.cc/59QB-3XLL] (using Tobin’s q to examine effect
on firm value from hedge fund activism).
13. See Sean J. Griffith & Natalia Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts and Shareholder Value, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1035 n.41 (2017) (referencing studies based on Tobin’s q in the second
paragraph of the main body of the article).
14. See Amihud et al., supra note 3 (using q to find that a staggered board has no significant
effect on firm value); Cremers et al., supra note 3 (using q to find that the relationship between
staggered boards and firm value is heterogeneous); Catan & Klausner, supra note 3 (also using q
to find that staggered boards have minimal effect on firm value).
15. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017) (discussing corporate governance studies based
on Tobin’s q).
16. See Tobin, supra note 8 (setting forth the analytical approach that serves as the point of
origination for Tobin’s q); see also William C. Brainard & James Tobin, Pitfalls in Financial ModelBuilding 9 (Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 244, 1968), https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/
default/files/files/pub/d02/d0244.pdf [https://perma.cc/85LR-XMBJ] (“One of the basic theoretical
propositions motivating the model is that the market valuation of equities, relative to the
replacement cost of the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of new
investment.”).
17. More specifically, scholars have used a simplified version of q in which the only market
value estimate is that of a firm’s equity securities; the market value of other securities (e.g., debt
and preferred stock) as well as the replacement value of assets are derived from book values. As
we demonstrate below, this simplified version of q is seriously flawed, and does not provide an
accurate estimate of firm value. Nevertheless, Simple q has become standard in the literature. We
discuss the evolution of Simple q from Tobin’s q in Part I. See infra Part I.
18. In terms of the scholarly use of Simple q, our critique is focused on the empirical corporate
finance literature. In addition, there also is a theoretical literature addressing Simple q in a
general equilibrium economic framework: scholars applying this framework have concluded that
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matter, Tobin’s q, in any specification, is not a good measure of the
value of corporations, either in theory or in practice. James Tobin did
not envision that scholars would use this measure to assess firm value,
and it is not fit for that purpose, particularly in its currently used
simplified form. When researchers began adopting a market-to-book
estimate of q as the dependent variable in empirical studies of firms,
some scholars warned about its inaccuracy, bias, and variability.19
Notwithstanding these warnings, academics continued to use marketto-book estimates, often without questioning their accuracy or meaning.
We begin in Part I by tracing the history of Tobin’s q within the
corporate law and finance literature. Our historical account reveals how
the use of Tobin’s q in this literature arose from untested assertions in
a handful of papers during the early 1980s, when a few scholars argued
that the value of a corporation’s assets might exceed their replacement
value due to superior management, despite other possible explanations
(e.g., monopoly power, temporary first mover advantages, intellectual
property rights, etc.). Our historical critique explores how these early
papers laid the foundation for the assumption that Tobin’s q necessarily
reflects firm value. Part I also explores how Tobin’s q morphed into
Simple q, despite clear warnings about the shortcomings of using a
market-to-book proxy as an estimate for Tobin’s q.
In Part II we explore some specific flaws in the assumption that
Tobin’s q is an appropriate measure of the value of corporations. First,
we assess various interpretations of Tobin’s q as a measure of firm value
and explain several flaws associated with these interpretations. These
flaws follow naturally from our historical critique.
Second, we examine some econometric problems associated with
the use of Simple q, detailing how the use of Simple q as a dependent
variable can produce biased coefficient estimates in linear regressions.
Substituting book value for replacement costs in the denominator can
generate statistical bias, both from the aggregation of assets and the
omission of assets (particularly intangible assets, such as intellectual
property). Simply put, firms with relatively high intangible assets

Simple q is a mean-reverting function associated with both the value premium and the volatility
of stock returns. See, e.g., Giovanni Walter Puopolo, The Dynamics of Tobin’s q (Centre for Studies
in Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 286, 2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9e62/
6dc7ced4b4d638d7ec1b35fe6a7f7921da24.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TAK-VY5T] (concluding that
Simple q is mean reverting); see also Patrick Bolton, Hui Chen & Neng Wang, A Unified Theory of
Tobin’s q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management, 66 J. FIN. 1545 (2011)
(proposing a model of how external financing costs influence firm investment).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 109–114 (discussing Perfect & Wiles’ analysis of
several different proxies for Tobin’s q, including Simple q).

Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

360

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

3/13/2020 2:12 PM

[Vol. 73:2:353

generally will have higher measures of Simple q.20 Moreover, because
this measurement error affects the denominator of Simple q,
conventional approaches to control for bias from aggregation and
omission (e.g., by adding a covariate that proxies for intangible assets)
will be ineffective. As we show, even when scholars acknowledge that
Simple q may contain measurement error, they have not recognized this
denominator-related statistical challenge, leading them to rely on
empirical solutions that do not address the risk of bias.
Third, we discuss a fact that might surprise many researchers:
Simple q is inversely associated with the following year’s annual
returns. This inverse association raises serious questions for studies
that interpret an increase in Simple q as an increase in firm value,
especially firm value over time.21 We argue that scholars should
explicitly consider the inverse relationship between Simple q and
subsequent returns, and the connection between this puzzle and other
related literatures, including financial asset pricing. Most notably, the
reciprocal of Simple q—the ratio of book value to market value—is
similar to a fundamental risk factor in the Fama-French asset pricing
model and its progeny, which we discuss in detail below; this similarity
and the relationship between Simple q and returns are not mentioned
in the literature relying on Simple q as a proxy for firm value.22
In Part III, we show that our critique of Simple q matters. We
do so by examining the results of an especially influential corporate
governance study by Harvard Law School professors Lucian Bebchuk,
20. The reason is straightforward arithmetic: if the denominator is lower because it omits
intangibles, the overall measure will involve division by a lower number, and therefore Simple q
will be higher. Moreover, because firms’ investments in intangibles vary, both by firm and over
time, conventional statistical approaches are problematic. For example, as we show in Appendix
A and discuss below, unbooked intangible assets are positively associated with Simple q, even
holding constant industry- and firm-fixed effects. See infra app. A. Within the finance literature,
Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor have developed a modified version of Tobin’s q, which they refer to
as Total q, to attempt to address the measurement error bias that arises from the market valuing
a firm’s intangible assets even though intangible assets are not part of balance sheet assets and
are highly serially correlated. See Ryan H. Peters & Lucian A. Taylor, Intangible Capital and the
Investment-q Relation, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 251, 269 (2017) (“This bias is probably most severe in the
standard regressions that omit intangible capital, as omitting intangible capital is an important
source of measurement error, and a firm’s intangible capital stock is highly serially correlated.”).
Total q includes in the denominator an estimate of a firm’s intangible assets, making it potentially
less problematic than Simple q. But Total q suffers from additional limitations as it is simply based
on the firm’s past expenditures on research and development and a thirty percent share of its prior
selling, general, and administrative expenditures.
21. See, e.g., Cremers et al., supra note 3, at 423 (finding that, among innovative firms,
adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in firm value as proxied by q and
concluding that “in more innovative firms . . . adopting (removing) a staggered board is associated
with an increase (decrease) in long-term firm value”).
22. See, e.g., Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks
and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993) (finding that book-market ratios are significantly associated
with equity returns).
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Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell.23 Their paper relies heavily on Simple
q and contributed to a wave of papers examining the relationship
between Simple q and various corporate governance interventions.
While we can replicate their findings using Simple q, our replication
study demonstrates that these findings disappear when we use an
alternative measure for Tobin’s q that seeks to correct for the omission
of intangible assets in Simple q. This alternative measure suffers from
problems similar to Simple q’s, such as aggregating all of a firm’s assets;
it also imposes strict assumptions in estimating intangible assets.
Accordingly, we do not endorse its use as a solution to the problems
posed by Simple q. On the contrary, our replication study simply
underscores the fragility of empirical findings relying on any q proxy
given the simple fact that the denominator of true q is unobservable.
Consequently, all q proxies measure it with error, and as we discuss,
using such a mismeasured ratio as a dependent variable in linear
regression makes the resulting estimates especially susceptible to bias.
Finally, we also show in Part III how the story of the use and
misuse of Tobin’s q in corporate governance research provides an
important insight into the current “replication crisis” within the social
sciences. Over the past several years, researchers across a range of
disciplines have been unable to replicate a number of notable empirical
findings due to both intentional data falsification as well as selective
reporting of data and results.24 Interventions meant to address this
crisis have focused almost exclusively on methods that can enhance the
likelihood that a study is replicable—a concern that, in the context of
scientific reasoning, implicates a study’s reliability. Yet these
interventions are ill-equipped to address the empirical problems that
arise when a measure fails to measure what it purports to measure, as
is the case with Simple q. The latter concern implicates a study’s
validity, and, as we discuss, efforts to enhance a study’s reliability can
paradoxically serve to encourage reliance on an invalid measure. Our
goal here is to expose Simple q as an invalid measure and, in the
process, discourage scholars from relying on it as a proxy for firm
value.25
23. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
24. See An Open, Large-Scale, Collaborative Effort to Estimate the Reproducibility of
Psychological Science, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 657 (2012) [hereinafter Effort to Estimate the
Reproducibility of Psychological Science] (describing a large-scale replication project within
psychology); Caren M. Rotello, Evan Heit & Chad Dubé, When More Data Steer Us Wrong:
Replications with the Wrong Dependent Measure Perpetuate Erroneous Conclusions, 22
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 944 (2015) (discussing the problems of replication and
misinterpretation plaguing psychological studies).
25. For scholars interested in examining how various regulatory and corporate governance
provisions relate to firm value, we recommend alternative techniques that do not rely on any
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In sum, we uncover the flawed assumption in many of the most
important studies in corporate law: the assumption that the market-tobook ratio is an appropriate measure of the value of corporations. As we
demonstrate, this ratio does not mean what many scholars seem to
think it means. In our view, without more robust testing, the
conclusions in corporate law that rely on market-to-book estimates for
Tobin’s q as a dependent variable are unsound and should not be the
basis for academic inquiry or policy decisions. Instead, scholars and
policymakers should approach studies based on Tobin’s q with caution.
Our examination of modern corporate law scholarship connects
to a broader phenomenon: the emergence of path-dependent yet
haphazard ideas in intellectual history.26 We hope to follow other
scholarship that shows how some ideas gain traction in academia but
later are exposed as inaccurate.27 Our hope is that, in the future,
scholars will look back on the flawed assumption in modern corporate
law scholarship as an interesting historical anecdote, a surprising
wrong turn, but one that has been superseded by more careful,
scientifically justified analysis in empirical law and finance.

version of Tobin’s q, and instead evaluate securities returns and direct estimates of firm value. We
find a promising example of the use of direct estimates of firm value in the accounting literature,
where scholars have long eschewed using Tobin’s q, and instead measure improvements in firm
value directly by using a firm’s market value of equity. See, e.g., Mary E. Barth & Sanjay Kallapur,
The Effects of Cross-Sectional Scale Differences on Regression Results in Empirical Accounting
Research, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 527 (1996) (investigating bias resulting from scale differences
in regressions based on market values); Mary E. Barth & Greg Clinch, Scale Effects in Capital
Markets-Based Accounting Research, 36 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 253 (2009) (assessing simulations of
the effects of firm size in regressions based on market values); James A. Ohlson & Seil Kim, Linear
Valuation Without OLS: The Theil-Sun Estimation Approach, 20 REV. ACCT. STUD. 395 (2015)
(discussing modifications of regressions based on market values to account for scale). In related
work, we also explore how using the natural logarithm of Simple q solves many of the empirical
challenges of using Simple q as an outcome variable in a linear regression framework. However,
to avoid imposing an assumption that the elasticity of a firm’s market value to its book value is
exactly one, a researcher should also include the natural log of a firm’s book value as a covariate
in the regression specification. As we illustrate there, adopting this approach is equivalent to using
the natural log of the numerator of Simple q—a direct estimate of firm value—to estimate the
effect of a regressor of interest on firm value. See Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Ratio
Problem (Jan. 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
26. The concept of supposed truths that are false and therefore should be rejected has existed
for centuries, and arguably emerged into widespread parlance from the King James Bible, which
included the admonition from the Apostle Paul to his young protégé, Timothy: “But refuse profane
and old wives’ fables, and exercise thyself rather unto godliness.” 1 Timothy 4:7 (King James).
27. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of
the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16–24 (2007)
(describing the emergence and reliance on the implicit minority discount (“IMD”) by courts
conducting a corporate valuation using a comparable company analysis, despite lacking any
support for the IMD within the academic finance literature).
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I. A HISTORY OF TOBIN’S Q
This Part sets forth a history of Tobin’s q, beginning with its
original use and then turning to more recent simplified specifications,
including Simple q. Although Simple q is widely used in corporate law
scholarship, its evolution from the original use of Tobin’s q in
macroeconomics has not previously been described in the literature.
The history of how Tobin’s q came to be seen as a proxy for firm value
and how it subsequently transformed into Simple q illustrates many of
the drawbacks of using Simple q in corporate law scholarship.
A. The Classical Macroeconomic View: 1968–1976
Although the variable Tobin’s q is typically attributed to the
economist James Tobin, the theoretical construct underlying it
originated from joint work between Tobin and William C. Brainard,28 a
colleague of Tobin’s at Yale. In 1968, Brainard and Tobin introduced a
theoretical model of an economy in which one central proposition was
that “the market valuation of equities, relative to the replacement cost
of the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of
investment.”29 They noted that investment in physical assets is
stimulated when physical capital is more highly valued in the market
than it costs to produce, and investment is discouraged when physical
capital is valued in the market below its replacement cost.30 Brainard
and Tobin were focused on explaining fluctuations in investment, so
they intuitively compared the market yield on equity with the real
returns to physical investment. In their 1968 paper, however, they did
not specify a variable with a letter to describe this concept. The concept
was not yet named “q.”
The setting in which Brainard and Tobin introduced the
conceptual underpinnings of q obviously was quite different than the
setting in which the concept is used in empirical law and finance
scholarship. The authors were comparing market prices with the

28. Although Tobin ultimately came to receive naming credit for q, Brainard also left a
considerable, though q-less, legacy, including the William C. Brainard Professorship of Economics
at Yale, where he served as provost from 1981 to 1986 and was chair of the economics department.
See Yale Officer: Provosts, YALE U. LIBR., https://guides.library.yale.edu/c.php?g=
296064&p=1973564 (last updated Jan. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5CT8-93Z6] (listing Brainard’s
tenure as Yale provost). Among Brainard’s Ph.D. students is David F. Swensen, the long-time Yale
chief investment officer. Chair Pays Tribute to Economist William Brainard’s Leadership, GIVING
TO YALE (Dec. 19, 2008), https://giving.yale.edu/news/chair-pays-tribute-economist-williambrainards-leadership [https://perma.cc/QHZ8-386M].
29. Brainard & Tobin, supra note 16, at 9.
30. Id.
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replacement cost of physical assets in order to describe fluctuations in
investment that were relevant for the purposes of macroeconomic
modeling. Indeed, their paper was specifically directed toward
monetary economists, and the relevance of the relationship between
market prices and the replacement cost of physical assets was to
explain how monetary policy might affect investment in the real
economy. In their words, this relationship was “the sole linkage in the
model through which financial events, including monetary policies,
affect the real economy.”31
A year later, in 1969, Tobin published A General Equilibrium
Approach to Monetary Theory. In developing the macroeconomic model
in that paper, Tobin reiterated the concept of market value versus
replacement costs and stated that he would “allow the value of existing
capital goods, or of titles to them, to diverge from their current
reproduction cost.”32 Tobin then used the letter q to describe the ratio
of the market value of capital goods and their replacement costs.33
Because Tobin allowed q to depart from a one-to-one ratio, he noted how
this variation could be interpreted in then-current versions of the
Investment Saving–Liquidity Preference Money Supply (“IS–LM”)
macroeconomic model.34 In Tobin’s formulation, if q equaled one, the
standard IS–LM curves held.35 But if q were greater than or less than
one, there would be a short-run disequilibrium.36 The long-run
equilibrium would then require some form of adjustment, so that q
would move in the direction of one.37 Tobin illustrated the effects of
changes in q on the IS–LM model in Figure 3 of his 1969 paper,38 which
is reproduced from the original below.

31. Id.
32. Tobin, supra note 8, at 19.
33. Id. at 21. We follow the literature in using the terms “physical capital” and “capital goods”
interchangeably.
34. See id. (observing that “equation (I.5) can be interpreted as a species of the standard
Keynesian LM curve”).
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id. at 22–23.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id. at 22 fig.3.
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Tobin cautioned in his concluding remarks that “[t]he models
discussed here were meant to be illustrative only, and to give meaning
to some general observations about monetary analysis.”39 Tobin
concluded that the key insight associated with the introduction of q
related to monetary policy: the major way for monetary policy to affect
aggregate demand was “by changing the valuation of physical assets
relative to their replacement costs.”40 In other words, the context for the
introduction of q was as a tool in the theory of monetary policy. Tobin’s
q was truly “Macro q”: it had nothing to do with measuring the effects
of a change in policy or a shock on relative prices; instead, it was a
potential lever that might be used to change aggregate demand (the
dependent variable in Tobin’s model). In general terms, Tobin’s q
described how financial markets affected investment and economic
activity. Put another way, Tobin’s q began its life as a potential
independent variable on the right side of financial equations, not as a
dependent variable on the left.

39. Id. at 29.
40. Id.
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According to Tobin, the deviation of q from one was an important
short-term determinant of investment. Specifically, in Tobin’s model, if
q were above one, the value of physical assets would be relatively high.
Firms would invest a greater amount, because they would benefit from
buying assets at a lower cost than their market value. Accordingly, in
Tobin’s model, when q was greater than one, investment should
increase. Conversely, when q was less than one, investment should
decrease. In the long run, adjustments in capital investment should
occur, so that a firm’s actual physical capital or capital goods should
approach the optimal level.41
Tobin’s q remained an important concept in macroeconomic
theory throughout the 1970s and it continues to play a role in that field
today.42 However, Tobin’s q did not play any role in corporate law or
corporate governance at its inception.
B. Early Interpretations from Empirical Finance: 1977–1984
Not surprisingly, the first empirical studies using Tobin’s q
focused on examining the sensitivity of investment outlays to changes
in the incentive to invest.43 Indeed, the stagflation of the 1970s made
Tobin’s theory particularly attractive to scholars seeking to understand
how factors other than interest rates might affect corporate investment.
Similar considerations motivated pioneering work on how tax policy
might affect corporate investment through changes in Tobin’s q.44 In
keeping with this macroeconomic focus, these early papers examined
aggregate levels of Tobin’s q across the entire economy, generally using
federal flow of funds data to estimate Tobin’s q.45 Scholars did not focus
on Tobin’s q at the individual firm level.
41. Note that Tobin’s model explicitly contemplated that in the short run the measure of q
would fluctuate. Indeed, the explanatory power of Tobin’s model derived in part from the
fluctuations in q.
42. Tobin refined his macroeconomic model during the 1970s. See James Tobin, Monetary
Policies and the Economy: The Transmission Mechanism, 37 S. ECON. J. 421 (1978).
43. See e.g., George M. von Furstenberg, Corporate Investment: Does Market Valuation
Matter in the Aggregate?, 1977 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 347 (empirically examining
whether the q ratio predicts investment by nonfinancial corporations).
44. See e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory
Approach, 1981 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 67 (examining corporate investment as a
function of changes in tax-adjusted q).
45. See e.g., Fumio Hayashi, Tobin’s Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation,
50 ECONOMETRICA 213, 214 (1982) (“[W]e calculate modified q from data on average q taking into
account the actual U.S. tax system and estimate a simple linear investment function.”); Summers,
supra note 44, at 85 (noting that their “equations and diagram[s] can be interpreted as referring
to the entire economy rather than an individual firm”); von Furstenberg, supra note 43, at 347
(describing an intention to explore the “influence on aggregate investment behavior” of “[b]alancesheet variables and stock-market appraisals,” which, at that time, remained “less clear”).
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During this same time, in a different area of research, scholars
in empirical corporate finance, who traditionally had used accountingbased measures to assess firm profitability, began raising several
objections to those measures.46 In particular, scholars expressed
concern that accounting rates of return measured only past profits and
did not reflect expectations about the future.47 Accounting measures did
not reflect assessments of risk, either.48 Moreover, they were sensitive
to inflation, a major concern during the late 1970s, when inflation rates
and nominal interest rates were very high.49 At this time, financial
economists first considered introducing Tobin’s q onto new scholarly
turf: to evaluate firm performance. Might Tobin’s q be better than
accounting-based measures?
A potential answer appeared in a 1981 article by Eric
Lindenberg, a researcher at AT&T, and Stephen Ross, an economist at
Yale (and a colleague of James Tobin).50 Lindenberg and Ross titled
their article Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization, but they
opened the article more modestly, by referencing the use of Tobin’s q in
macroeconomic models, not industrial organization.51 They noted the
important intuition arising from Tobin’s macroeconomic model that if
firms took all profitable opportunities when the value of their new
capital investment exceeded its cost (in other words, when Tobin’s q was
greater than one), then the marginal value of Tobin’s q should converge
to one.52 This reference, and the intuition backing it, had become
standard in the macroeconomics literature.
But then Lindenberg and Ross said something extraordinary:
“We will employ this argument peripherally below, but our focus is
somewhat different. Our interest is in the cross-sectional value of q and

46. See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of
Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 84 (1983) (demonstrating that accounting
rates of return are not a reliable proxy for the economic rate of return); Ezra Solomon, Alternative
Rate of Return Concepts and Their Implications for Utility Regulation, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 65, 80 (1970) (critiquing the prevalent mistake of assuming that book rate of return measures
and discounted-cash flow (“DCF”) rate of return measures are estimates of the same thing);
Thomas R. Stauffer, The Measurement of Corporate Rates of Return: A Generalized Formulation,
2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 434, 467 (1971) (demonstrating that “the accounting rate of return
is generally a very poor proxy for the economic or DCF rate of return”).
47. See Solomon, supra note 46, at 65 (showing that returns based on book value and returns
based on discounted cash flow rarely generate similar results).
48. See Stauffer, supra note 46 (analyzing factors associated with bias in accounting returns).
49. See Fisher & McGowan, supra note 46, at 82 (noting that accounting practices do not
incorporate allowances for inflation).
50. See Eric B. Lindenberg & Stephen A. Ross, Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization,
54 J. BUS. 1 (1981).
51. See id. at 1–2.
52. See id. at 2.
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its implications for industrial organization in general . . . .”53 In other
words, Lindenberg and Ross were transporting Tobin’s macroeconomic
q to a new context, where the variable might take on entirely different
meanings and functions.
Instead of focusing on the effects on capital investment when q
differed from one, as Tobin and his followers had, Lindenberg and Ross
described the range of reasons why Tobin’s q might differ from one.
Their analysis of why the variable might differ from one included the
prospect of Ricardian and monopoly rents, which presumably would
lead to asset market values that were higher than their replacement
values.54 Thus, Lindenberg and Ross suggested that Tobin’s q might be
useful not only in examining levels of investment, but also in assessing
firm profitability and monopoly power. The implicit conclusion that
firms with a high value of Tobin’s q were more profitable was asserted
but not rigorously defended.
Most importantly, Lindenberg and Ross developed a procedure
for calculating Tobin’s q. They created a database of Tobin’s q estimates
for a large sample of firms and then used it to examine the dispersion
of supercompetitive market power across different companies and
industries.55 The implication of their pathbreaking paper was that other
scholars also could use Tobin’s q to examine and assess differences
among firms. In other words, they provided a template for how Tobin’s
q could be measured and evaluated for individual firms.
The new Lindenberg and Ross formulation of Tobin’s q was
catnip for empirical corporate finance researchers. During the early
1980s, researchers began advocating Tobin’s q as a measure that was
superior to the range of accounting-based measures that scholars had
been using to assess firm profitability.56 By adopting and then adapting
Tobin’s q from the theoretical macroeconomics literature, empirical
researchers in corporate finance potentially had found a more accurate
measure to use in assessing firm profitability.
Following Lindenberg and Ross, finance scholars began to
embrace Tobin’s q.57 It offered several advantages compared to
53. Id. at 2.
54. See id. at 2–3 (proposing reasons why “the actual q value of even a competitive firm may
differ from unity”).
55. See id. at 10 tbl.1.
56. See, e.g., Henry McFarland, Evaluating q as an Alternative to the Rate of Return in
Measuring Profitability, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 614, 614 (1988) (citing the literature assessing
firm profitability).
57. Mark Hirschey, Market Structure and Market Value, 58 J. BUS. 89 (1985) (reexamining
the relationship between market structure and monopoly profits as proxied by Tobin’s q);
McFarland, supra note 56 (exploring whether accounting estimates of q are less erroneous than
accounting rates of return); Michael A. Salinger, Tobin’s q, Unionization, and the Concentration-
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accounting measures. Because the numerator of Tobin’s q included
market value, it reflected expectations about the future. Market prices
also reflected assessments of risk, because they were influenced by
expectations about the variance of future profits. Replacement cost, the
denominator of Tobin’s q, was difficult to calculate, but Lindenberg and
Ross had demonstrated it could be estimated based on
contemporaneous data. Throughout the early and mid-1980s, several
scholarly articles discussed the extent to which Tobin’s q might be a
viable substitute for purely accounting-based metrics. We turn next to
this research.
C. The Divergence Between Macroeconomics and Empirical Finance:
1984–1992
During the 1980s, as Tobin’s q gained traction among financial
economists as a measure of firm performance, two notable trends
emerged that highlighted a growing divide between the use of Tobin’s q
by macroeconomists and financial economists. The first difference was
conceptual; the second was definitional.
First, consistent with the early macroeconomic literature testing
Tobin’s original theory, several macroeconomists explored the
relationship between Tobin’s q and corporate investment. Their papers
largely reflected the original conception of Tobin’s q (as articulated by
Tobin).58 However, an important theoretical modification was made in
1982 by Fumio Hayashi, who sought to connect formally the insights of
Tobin with the neoclassical theory of investment.59 This latter theory
had generally focused on modeling a firm’s investment in its physical
capital as an optimization challenge in which a firm sought to maximize
returns to scale while accounting for “installation costs.”60 Recognizing
the theoretical importance of installation costs, Hayashi formally
modified Tobin’s theory to account for them: in this new “q-theory of
investment,” a firm decides the optimal rate of investment through

Profits Relationship, 15 RAND J. ECON. 159 (1984) (using Tobin’s q to examine the link between
market structure and monopoly profits); Michael Smirlock et al., Tobin’s q and the StructurePerformance Relationship, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1051 (1984) (using q to measure firm rents).
58. See, e.g., Steven M. Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Peterson, Financing
Constraints and Corporate Investment, 1988 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 141 (studying
the impact of financing constraints on corporate investment by individual firms after controlling
for q); Michael A. Salinger & Lawrence H. Summers, Tax Reform and Corporate Investment: A
Microeconomic Simulation Study, in BEHAVIORAL SIMULATION METHODS IN TAX POLICY ANALYSIS
247 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1983) (developing a methodology for simulating the effects of alternative
corporate tax reforms on corporate investment by individual firms).
59. See Hayashi, supra note 45.
60. Id. at 215.
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knowledge of Tobin’s q and the firm’s installation costs.61 Notably, given
the focus on a firm’s investment in physical capital and installation
costs, Tobin’s q within this literature represented the market value of
the firm relative to the replacement costs of its physical capital.
In contrast, within finance circles the possibility that Tobin’s q
might reflect a firm’s ability to extract economic rents was increasingly
conflated with the possibility that Tobin’s q reflected firm value. An
article commonly cited as pioneering the use of Tobin’s q in this regard
is Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny’s 1988 study of
the relationship between management ownership and firm value.62 In
examining a cross section of 371 firms using data from 1980, they found
that Tobin’s q rose with management ownership in firms where
management held a small percentage of equity, but declined in firms
where management held a larger percentage.63 Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny assumed that high Tobin’s q firms were associated with higher
expected future profits,64 an assumption we examine in Part II.
It is worth noting that the version of Tobin’s q used by Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny is markedly different from the Simple q marketto-book ratio used today. First, they used actual estimates of
replacement costs, from the 1980 Griliches R&D Master file, rather
than book value, to estimate the denominator of Tobin’s q.65 This
financial dataset was created by the National Bureau of Economic
Research for a sample of firms during the late 1970s and early 1980s
and provided a variety of metrics one could use to estimate actual
replacement values.66 Second, they used actual estimates of the market
values of preferred stock and long-term debt rather than book value to

61. The “q-theory of investment” remains provocative given the informational content it
attributes to Tobin’s q. As Hayashi noted, “All the information about the demand curve for the
firm’s output and the production function that are relevant to the investment decision is
summarized by q.” Id. at 218. Additionally, in the neoclassical theory of investment, note that
firms make investment decisions on the margin—that is, an optimizing firm evaluates the benefits
of investing in an additional unit of capital relative to the costs of acquiring and installing an
additional unit of capital. As such, in applying Tobin’s work to the neoclassical framework, the
relevant metric was a firm’s marginal q (the ratio of the market value of an additional unit of
capital to its replacement cost) rather than its overall, or average, q. While marginal q is an
unobservable construct, Hayashi’s work established conditions under which marginal and average
q were the same, thereby opening the door to rigorous statistical testing of the q-theory of
investment. Id.
62. See Morck et al., supra note 6.
63. See id. at 311 (summarizing the study’s results).
64. Id. at 312 n.12.
65. Id. at 296.
66. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The R&D Master File Documentation (NBER Technical Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 72, 1988), https://www.nber.org/papers/t0072.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEA9LVRQ].
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estimate their Tobin’s q numerators.67 Third, they extensively
discussed the potential bias associated with their Tobin’s q estimates.68
(Scholars later largely abandoned all of these practices and instead
simply used book values for all measures except stock prices, without
discussion.69)
However, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny did not show the same
degree of care in describing their rationale for using Tobin’s q as a
measure for firm value. In explaining the choice of Tobin’s q as the
outcome variable, the authors explained that “Tobin’s Q is high when
the firm has valuable intangible assets in addition to physical capital,
such as monopoly power [Lindenberg and Ross (1981)], goodwill, a stock
of patents, or good managers.”70 They noted that high Tobin’s q might
arise from any of these sources of “intangible assets,” and then simply
asserted that Tobin’s q reflected management performance and,
therefore, firm value. The boldness of this unsubstantiated claim,
published in 1988, makes it worth quoting in its entirety: “Although Q
is undoubtedly a very noisy signal of management performance, we
believe it is well-suited to our purpose. Because we are interested in the
predictable effects of a firm’s ownership structure on its value, it seems
natural to look at the cross-sectional relationship between ownership
and value.”71
In two sentences, Tobin’s q was thus transformed into a proxy
for management’s effect on firm value. Despite the uncertainty as to
why the measure might be “well-suited” to Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny’s purpose or “natural” for examining the relationship between
ownership and “value,” this notion of Tobin’s q as reflecting firm value
took root.72 By the early 1990s, prominent papers in finance were citing,
though not analyzing or critiquing, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)
and Lindenberg and Ross (1981) as the justification for using Tobin’s q
as a proxy for firm value.73
67. Morck et al., supra note 6, at 296.
68. See id. at 295–307 (providing extensive discussion of the above factors).
69. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities
Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 169, 177 (1997):
We measure average Tobin’s Q as the market value of assets divided by the book value
of assets (item 6) where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus
the market value of common equity less the sum of the book value of common equity
(item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74).
70. Morck et al., supra note 6, at 296.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Henri Servaes, Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers, 46 J. FIN. 409, 417–18
(1991) (interpreting q as a “measure of managerial performance”); see also Benjamin E. Hermalin
& Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm
Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT. 101, 103–05 (1991) (using q as a proxy for firm value for estimating
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In addition to the conceptual differences in the use of Tobin’s q
in macroeconomics and finance, scholars in these two areas adopted
distinct definitions of Tobin’s q. The fault line between the two camps
was generally whether one was examining the q theory of investment
(the macroeconomic approach) or the determinants of firm value (the
finance approach). Macroeconomists examining the effects of Tobin’s q
on investment behavior typically defined Tobin’s q as the ratio of the
market value of a firm’s stock of tangible capital to that stock’s
replacement value.74 This “Macro q” ratio resembles the original
framework of Brainard and Tobin, who had sought to explain the
incentives to invest in physical capital.75 The macroeconomic
formulation was also consistent with the idea introduced by Hayashi
that installation costs might deter a high Tobin’s q firm from investing.
In contrast, finance scholars defined Tobin’s q as the ratio of the
market value of the firm’s outstanding securities to the replacement
cost of all of the firm’s assets, not only its physical capital. Although
early papers that used Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value, such as
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), limited the denominator of Tobin’s
q to the replacement value of a firm’s plant and inventories, by the early
1990s finance scholars were including all of a firm’s assets in the q
denominator—both tangible and (to the extent reported) intangible.76
Other authors were even less specific about the extent to which their
calculations included particular assets: for example, the first footnote
of a prominent paper published in 1990 in the Journal of Financial
Economics simply notes that a “variation of the Lindenberg and Ross
(1981) algorithm is used to compute the market value of the firm (debt
plus equity) and the replacement value of its assets. A description of the
procedure to compute these values is available from the authors.”77
Overall, empirical finance scholars during this time shifted their focus

the effect of board composition on firm value); McConnell & Servaes, supra note 6, at 599 (using q
as an outcome variable for estimating changes in firm value due to various measures of ownership).
The Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny paper was also the primary basis for using q as a proxy for firm
value in the important 2003 article by Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, which we
discuss in Part II. See Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 126 (referring to Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny’s study).
74. See, e.g., Fazzari et al., supra note 58, at 141 app. B (defining Tobin’s q to be equal to
(market value of equity + preferred stock debt + debt – market value of inventories) / (replacement
value of property, plant, and equipment)).
75. See Brainard & Tobin, supra note 16, at 9 (“One of the basic theoretical propositions
motivating the model is that the market valuation of equities, relative to the replacement cost of
the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of new investment.”).
76. See, e.g., Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 73, at 105 (“The denominator of q, the
replacement value of the firm’s assets, has three main components: the market value of capital
stock, the market value of inventories, and other assets.”).
77. McConnell & Servaes, supra note 6, at 600 n.1.
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to a firm’s assets overall, a move that was in many ways predictable
given the emerging assumption that Tobin’s q reflected a firm’s overall
performance and value.
This broader formulation of “Finance q” in the literature had
intuitive appeal, but it represents yet another departure from Tobin’s
original theory. Brainard and Tobin had noted that “[t]here are many
kinds of physical capital and many markets where existing stocks are
valued,”78 implying that in an ideal world, each different type of asset
should have a different Tobin’s q. Similarly, subsequent work by Fumio
Hayashi and Tohru Inoue noted that “one has to invoke a very stringent
set of assumptions including the Hicks aggregation condition [that all
of the firm’s assets are perfect substitutes in the production process] to
derive a one-to-one relation between the sum of investments and Q that
is independent of the composition of investments.”79 The tendency to
measure firm value by aggregating together assets as dissimilar as
capital goods, inventories, and intangibles accordingly fails this
condition.80
In other words, the macroeconomists’ analysis of Tobin’s q,
because it was focused on investment, was circumspect about
aggregating firm assets for comparison: tangibles and intangibles were
apples and oranges for the purposes of assessing changes in investment
and should not be lumped together. In contrast, financial economists
saw their version of Tobin’s q as a way to analyze a firm’s assets in the
aggregate, both tangibles and intangibles (as well as cash, investment
securities, accounts receivable, and so on), and accordingly were
comfortable grouping disparate categories of assets into one measure,
notwithstanding the questionable theoretical basis for doing so.
D. The Adoption of Simple Q as a Measure of the Value of
Corporations: 1994–Present
The most significant split between what we have labeled “Macro
q” versus “Finance q” was the move by empirical corporate finance
researchers to use a simplified calculation of Tobin’s q. As we have
noted, Simple q is, essentially, a market-to-book ratio: the market value
of a firm’s securities divided by the firm’s book value of assets. Today,
corporate finance scholars routinely and sanguinely use Simple q
78. Brainard & Tobin, supra note 16, at 9.
79. Fumio Hayashi & Tohru Inoue, The Relation Between Firm Growth and Q with Multiple
Capital Goods: Theory and Evidence from Panel Data on Japanese Firms, 59 ECONOMETRICA 731,
732 (1991).
80. Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, On the Accuracy of Different Measures of q, 35 FIN.
MGMT. 5, 9 (2006).
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largely without question, perhaps because it is wrapped up in the lore
of “Tobin’s q,” which might mask the fact that it is merely “market-tobook.”81 The story of how Simple q became so widely accepted is
surprising, given how many scholars warned, two decades ago, about
the potential problems with market-to-book estimates of Tobin’s q.
Macroeconomics scholars resisted simplistic market-to-book
estimates of Tobin’s q for theoretical reasons and because of
measurement error and data unavailability, problems that the “Macro
q” literature continues to address. In contrast, empirical corporate
finance scholars eagerly swallowed Simple q, methodological problems
and all. The recent corporate finance literature suggests that the
adoption of Simple q was straightforward and uncontroversial. In fact,
it was neither.
First, consider early versions of the “Finance q” numerator: the
market value of a firm’s securities. Although market values of the
common equity of publicly traded firms could be observed during the
1990s, an accurate measure of Tobin’s q needed to include all of a firm’s
capital, including preferred stock and debt. The valuations of these
other slices of capital often had to be estimated, because market prices
typically were not available.82 Scholars accordingly developed a range
of approaches to incorporate market-based data to estimate the
numerator at the firm level, but there were serious measurement

81. The use of market-to-book ratios elsewhere in the finance literature is not consistent with
their use in empirical corporate finance. For example, as we describe below, a firm’s market-tobook ratio has played an important role as one of the central risk factors in the asset pricing
literature. See infra notes 182–183 and accompanying text (discussing Fama and French’s
groundbreaking research on asset pricing). In particular, market-to-book ratios are inversely
related to future returns. As we discuss below, this empirical fact places the use of a de facto
market-to-book ratio as the proxy for q in tension with the notion that increasing q necessarily
means increasing long-term firm value. See id. Scholars also have explored the extent to which
high market-to-book ratios are associated with greater borrowing and lower financing costs. See
Long Chen & Xinlei Zhao, On the Relation Between the Market-to-Book Ratio, Growth Opportunity,
and Leverage Ratio, 3 FIN. RES. LETTERS 253, 254 (2006) (showing that the negative relation
between market-to-book and leverage is driven by a subset of firms with high market-to-book
ratios). With limited exceptions, scholars in the empirical finance literature have not addressed
the extent to which the subset of firms with the highest levels of q might share these same
empirical relationships.
82. W.G. Shepherd, Tobin’s q and the Structure-Performance Relationship, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 1205, 1206 (1986); Smirlock et al., supra note 57, at 1058–59.
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challenges.83 Early efforts to measure “Finance q” included lengthy
appendices that outlined particular methods, data, and assumptions.84
Second, consider early versions of the “Finance q” denominator:
the replacement value of a firm’s capital assets. The market value of a
firm’s capital assets reflects intangible assets such as customer goodwill
and technical knowledge, yet readily available accounting and balancesheet–based measures of a firm’s assets do not include such values.85
Accounting measures of asset values are also generally recorded at
historical cost and then adjusted using depreciation schedules that
typically do not reflect the true economic depreciation of the firm’s
assets.86 Firms also have the ability to choose different depreciation
schedules.
Moreover, although during the early 1980s many publicly traded
firms were required to estimate replacement costs for some assets based
on rules established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board,
those estimates often were not based on market prices when active
markets did not exist.87 In addition, after 1984, even these firms were
no longer required to provide replacement cost estimates; accordingly,
the National Bureau of Economic Research was unable to augment its
database for researchers to estimate replacement values for firms.
Since the mid-1980s, it has been difficult, if not impossible, for
researchers to calculate reliable estimates of replacement costs for the
assets of publicly traded firms.88 As a result, there were, and are,
serious difficulties in estimating the Tobin’s q denominator.
83. For example, several scholars collected the prices of long-term bonds so that their
measure did not assume that the market value and book value of debt were the same. These bond
prices were available then from the Moody’s Bond Record and Standard & Poor’s Bond Guide. See
Kee H. Chung & Stephen W. Pruitt, A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s q, 23 FIN. MGMT. 70, 71
n.3 (1994) (describing studies that collected long-term bond prices). In addition, researchers had
information about the replacement cost of net plant, equipment, and inventories from the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) Regulation 33 Tape, edited by researchers at
Columbia University. However, that dataset was available only during 1979 to 1984, and only for
firms with net plant and equipment of more than $120 million. See id.
84. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang et al., Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signaling vs. Free
Cash Flow Hypothesis?, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 181, 186 (1989) (describing methodology for estimating
values of preferred stock, bonds, and replacement costs for purposes of estimating a firm’s Tobin’s
q); Larry H.P. Lang et al., A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns,
29 J. FIN ECON. 315, 319 (1991) (using the Lindenberg and Ross algorithm to estimate firms’
Tobin’s q); Lindenberg & Ross, supra note 50, at app. (explaining their methodology in defining
replacement cost).
85. See McFarland, supra note 56, at 614–15 (discussing how the omission of intangible
assets from the book value of assets can bias Tobin’s q).
86. Id. at 616.
87. Id. at 615 n.4.
88. Lang, Stulz, and Walking describe the arduous process of obtaining replacement cost
estimates, a process that contrasts so sharply with the use of Simple q that it is worth quoting in
full:
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Despite these measurement challenges, the growing interest in
using Tobin’s q in empirical corporate finance inspired scholars to
search for ways to estimate Tobin’s q to enable its use across a broader
cross section of firms. These efforts only heightened the measurement
error. Most notably, in 1994, Kee Chung and Stephen Pruitt set forth a
simpler version of calculating Tobin’s q based on inputs that were easily
downloaded from available financial and accounting databases.89
Chung and Pruitt defined “approximate q” using the following equation:
Approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA
where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of
common shares outstanding, PS is the liquidating value of any
outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term
liabilities net of its short-term assets plus the book value of long-term
debt, and TA is the book value of the firm’s total assets. In short,
“approximate q” was nothing more than a slightly modified version of
the firm’s market-to-book ratio, with book value substituted for market
value of preferred and debt securities in the numerator. Calculating the
denominator of Tobin’s q had seemed impossible; suddenly it was a
snap.
Replacement costs of net plant and equipment and inventories are obtained from the
FASB regulation 33 tape edited by Columbia University that covers the period 1979–
1984. Although these data are unaudited and firms are allowed considerable discretion
in their estimates, the data are the best available information on replacement costs.
Corporations with net plant valued in excess of $120 million were required to report
replacement costs of plant and inventories to FASB from 1979 to 1984. Consequently,
no replacement cost data are provided by firms before 1979 or after 1984 or by firms
with net plant valued at less than 120 million dollars.
When firms do not report replacement costs, we use the Lindenberg and Ross
algorithm to estimate these costs. Plant and equipment are valued by setting up an
acquisition schedule and adjusting for price level changes and depreciation as suggested
by Lindenberg and Ross (1889) [sic]. Specifically, for firms listed on the FASB tape, we
begin with the plant replacement costs closest to 1979 or 1984 as appropriate in the
Lindenberg and Ross formula for that year. We then work backward or forward using
the formula to obtain estimates of replacement costs before 1979 or after 1984,
respectively. We follow Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984) and assume the
technological parameter to be zero.
To obtain the replacement costs for smaller firms that do not report these
replacement costs at all, we assume that the value of plant at the start (1967) is equal
to book value. Following the work by Smirlock, Gilligan, and Marshall (1984), we reduce
the value of plant and equipment by 5% each year to compensate for depreciation and
then adjust it for the GNP deflator for nonresidential fixed investment. We then use
the formula proposed by Lindenberg and Ross. If inventories are not reported in the
FASB 33 tape, we use the Lindenberg and Ross (1981) algorithm.
Larry H.P. Lang et al., Managerial Performance, Tobin’s Q, and the Gains from Successful Tender
Offers, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 153 (1989).
89. See Chung & Pruitt, supra note 83, at 71.
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Unlike “Macro q,” Chung and Pruitt’s “approximate q” entirely
avoided the need to calculate the replacement value of assets; rather, it
assumed that the replacement values of plant, equipment, and
inventories were equal to their book values. Chung and Pruitt also
simplified the treatment of long-term debt and preferred stock. Instead
of attempting to calculate market values of debt or preferred stock, their
measure simply substituted book values for market values of a firm’s
sources of capital other than common equity. As they noted, this
approach had a clear advantage over more nuanced estimates of q in
that “all of these required inputs are readily obtainable from a firm’s
basic financial and accounting information.”90
Chung and Pruitt justified their version of Tobin’s q, as
contrasted with the more complicated Lindenberg-Ross measure, by
pointing to their measure’s mean, median, and maximum deviations
from it, which were 6.8 percent, 6.2 percent, and 18.0 percent,
respectively.91 Chung and Pruitt optimistically concluded that the
average error of 6.8 percent was tolerable, because it “compare[d]
extremely favorably with the errors typically observed in other financial
estimates.”92 They asserted as a justification that “managers would
gladly accept a contract stipulating a mean (maximum) 6.8 (18.0)%
error in virtually all of their business decisions.”93 Chung and Pruitt
also noted that the 6.8 percent error compared favorably to larger errors
in capital budgeting projections and forecasts, both in the private and
government sectors, and in forecasts by securities analysts.94
In short, instead of warning scholars about a 6.8 percent
estimated error, Chung and Pruitt used the error as a marketing pitch
for their simplified version of Tobin’s q.95 They asserted that their
simplified version of Tobin’s q would be particularly important when
more “theoretically correct” estimates were unavailable.96 They claimed
that because their simplified version of Tobin’s q used readily available
balance sheet information, it therefore “should prove of significant
interest to both academic researchers and financial practitioners.”97
Chung and Pruitt noted that, although academics frequently
used Tobin’s q, their “discussions with several senior financial
managers suggest little, if any, reliance upon q in real-world decision
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
See id. at 72 (describing the results of their calculations for forty randomly selected firms).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 72–73.
See id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
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analysis.”98 They explained that “the availability of timely and accurate
[Tobin’s] q data [was] severely limited when compared with known
sources of other important financial variables, such as beta.”99 However,
given the ready availability of accounting data for firms, Chung and
Pruitt imagined that “thousands of corporate financial analysts” might
one day use their measure of Tobin’s q.100 They added, “Given the
potential for Tobin’s q to provide valuable insight into a variety of
important business and financial decisions, it is plausible that
approximate q or some variation of it may one day play an important
role in financial analysis,”101 a prediction that seems omniscient in
hindsight.
Also in 1994, at the same time Chung and Pruitt were offering
their simplified version of “approximate q,” Steven Perfect and Kenneth
Wiles published an analysis of how sensitive the results of empirical
corporate finance studies were to different versions of Tobin’s q for
purposes of estimating firm value.102 Perfect and Wiles compared five
different constructions of Tobin’s q.103 One of the five estimates was qs,
which they labeled the “simple q ratio.”104
Although the methodologies used to calculate the five measures
were similar to each other in many respects, the methodology for qs was
the most straightforward.105 The numerator of qs included common
stock, preferred stock, short-term debt, and long-term debt.106 Common

98. Id. at 70.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. As of early 2019, Chung and Pruitt’s article was the most cited of the approximately
30,000 articles mentioning Tobin’s q generated by a search of “Tobin’s q” on Google Scholar, with
more than 2,500 citations.
102. See Stephen B. Perfect & Kenneth W. Wiles, Alternative Constructions of Tobin’s q: An
Empirical Comparison, 1 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 313 (1994).
103. Id. at 314. They noted that q had become an increasingly popular measure of firm
performance in academic research because it provided an estimate of the value of a firm’s
intangible assets, including monopoly power, goodwill, high quality managers, and growth
opportunities. Id. at 313–14. Perfect and Wiles did not determine that those techniques actually
resulted in estimates that reflected market values; instead, they were simply comparing five
different approaches. See id. at 314 (“We do not, however, determine which estimator most closely
approximates the firm’s true value.”).
104. Id. at 315.
105. See id. at 315–16, 335 (describing the procedures used to estimate q ratios for each of the
sample firms and noting that qs “is relatively simple to construct”). All of the other measures used
market prices for common stock and various estimating techniques for the market value of
preferred stock and debt. See id. at 317–24. Some of the estimating techniques were quite
complicated: for example, calculating estimates of the market value of debt involved both estimates
of changes in yields and a recursive methodology to calculate the maturity structure of a firm’s
debt. See id. at 317–18.
106. See id. at 315–16 (presenting and explaining the variables represented in the equation
for qs).
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stock was based on year-end prices, preferred stock was estimated, and
debt was based on book values.107 The denominator of qs was simply the
book value of a firm’s assets.108
Perfect and Wiles conceded that the assumptions associated
with qs introduced inevitable and problematic aspects of measurement
error.109 Speaking of the denominator, for instance, they noted, “While
these data are easily obtainable, they do not reflect the effects of
inflation or technological innovation.”110 Their concerns were consistent
with emerging research in the macroeconomics literature that had been
grappling expressly with the estimation errors created by using an
inaccurate measure of Tobin’s q. For example, some empirical studies
in the “Macro q” literature warned that the relationship between
Tobin’s q and investment behavior was weak or insignificant,111 which
led macroeconomists to confront the possibility that these null results
were a product of measurement error in Tobin’s q.112
107. In each of the five models, the value of preferred stock was estimated, because of its
infrequency of trading. Id. at 316–17. The estimation techniques involved both using reported
prices in Compustat and capitalizing the total preferred dividends based on the Standard and
Poor’s preferred stock yield index; these two techniques arrived at comparable estimates. See id.
at 317–18 (explaining the differences between the two approaches and presenting descriptive
statistics for the preferred stocks used).
108. See id. at 315–16 (listing SRC, “the firm’s year-end book value of total assets,” as the
denominator of the qs equation).
109. See id. at 329, 338 (recognizing that using the book value of a firm’s total assets to
estimate replacement costs can lead to underestimating replacement costs).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Andrew B. Abel & Olivier J. Blanchard, The Present Value of Profits and Cyclical
Movements in Investment, 54 ECONOMETRICA 249, 249–50 (1986) (noting that empirical studies
regressing investment on q show that q fails to explain variations in investment); Richard
Blundell, Stephen Bond, Michael Devereux & Fabio Schiantarelli, Investment and Tobin’s Q:
Evidence from Company Panel Data, 51 J. ECONOMETRICS 233, 247, 251–52 (1992) (analyzing a
number of different estimations of q and finding that strong assumptions were required to derive
a relationship between investment and average q); Jason G. Cummins, Kevin A. Hassett & Glenn
R. Hubbard, A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior Using Tax Reforms As Natural
Experiments, 1994 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1, 4, 53–54 (arguing that q explains
investment poorly); Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Evidence on q and Investment for Japanese
Firms, 4 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 371, 388–90 (1990) (performing an empirical analysis of
Tobin’s q and finding that the relationship between investment and q is not stable and did not
accurately explain Japanese investment during the economic boom from 1983–88).
112. See Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, Measurement Error and the Relationship
Between Investment and q, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1027 (2000) [hereinafter Erickson & Whited,
Measurement] (examining whether the failure of q to predict investment in empirical research is
due to error in measuring Tobin’s q); see also Timothy Erickson & Toni W. Whited, Treating
Measurement Error in Tobin’s q, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1286 (2012) [hereinafter Erickson & Whited,
Treating] (examining estimators that help remedy measurement error in q). Much of the careful
analysis of measurement error in Tobin’s q has been in the macroeconomic context, which as we
have noted uses Tobin’s q as an independent variable to explain corporate investment rather than
as a dependent variable. It is well known that measurement error in an independent variable can
result in biased regression estimates, which no doubt helps explain the focus on measurement
error in the Macro q context. Interestingly, this analysis does not seem to have migrated to the
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The greater sensitivity to measurement error in the
macroeconomic literature was also due in part to the econometric
challenges associated with using Tobin’s q as an independent variable
associated with investment behavior, as had been typical in that
literature.113 These concerns regarding measurement error in proxies
for q also led the macroeconomics literature to focus on the problems
that Perfect and Wiles raised regarding estimates of intangible
assets.114
One might imagine that finance scholars, like macroeconomics
scholars, would see Perfect and Wiles’s findings as a warning, a yellow
light for market-to-book estimates of q, if not a red one. Perfect and
Wiles certainly saw their findings as cautionary, and anyone who read
the first sentence of their abstract was warned: “Although Tobin’s q is
an attractive theoretical firm performance measure, its empirical
construction is subject to considerable measurement error.”115 The
abstract further put a reader on notice that market-to-book estimates
of q were especially problematic: “The simple-to-construct estimator
produces empirical results that differ significantly from the alternative
estimators.”116 Readers who made it past the abstract would receive,
page after page, the unmistakable message that if they chose to use a
market-to-book estimate for q, they would do so at their peril.
Yet finance scholars cited Perfect and Wiles, not as a source of
concern, but as a justification for using a simplistic version of Tobin’s

empirical corporate finance literature, though as we explain below the potential bias from
measurement error in Tobin’s q is seriously problematic even when Tobin’s q is used as an outcome
variable.
113. See Erickson & Whited, Measurement, supra note 112, at 1030:
Mismeasurement of marginal q can generate all the pathologies afflicting empirical
q models. In the classical errors-in-variables model, for example, the ordinary least
squares (OLS) R2 is a downward-biased estimate of the true model’s coefficient of
determination, and the OLS coefficient estimate for the mismeasured regressor is
biased toward zero. Irrelevant variables may appear significant since coefficient
estimates for perfectly measured regressors can be biased away from zero. This bias
can differ greatly between two subsamples, even if the rate of measurement error is the
same in both.
114. For example, writing in the “Macro q” tradition, Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor have
developed an alternative estimate for Tobin’s q called “Total q” that includes in its denominator
an estimate of the replacement cost of a firm’s intangible assets, along with the book value of a
firm’s property, plant, and equipment. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 256 (describing the
calculation method for Total q); infra notes 174–176 (same); see also Peters and Taylor Total Q,
WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS. (July 19, 2016), http://www.whartonwrds.com/datasets/included/
luke-taylors-total-q/ [https://perma.cc/NB43-PUHE] (presenting a Total q dataset).
115. Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 313.
116. Id.
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q.117 In an extraordinary reinterpretation, Perfect and Wiles became a
green light for market-to-book estimates, including Simple q.
One reason researchers were sanguine about a market-to-book
estimate of q was its appearance on the left side of regressions, rather
than the right side. In contrast to the macroeconomists’ use of Tobin’s q
as an independent variable, where measurement error was known to be
likely to create biased regression estimates, the financial economists’
use of Tobin’s q as a dependent variable (e.g., in the estimation of
whether governance provisions were associated with firm value) did not
generate similar concerns. Instead, the assumption was that
measurement error in Tobin’s q as an outcome variable should not bias
any coefficients in the regression so long as the measurement error is
random (although it might cause standard errors to be larger than they
would be in the absence of measurement error). In a separate paper, we
show that this assumption is correct for the mismeasurement of the
numerator of Tobin’s q, but is wrong when mismeasurement affects the
denominator.118
For scholars using Tobin’s q as an outcome variable, the
assumption that random measurement error in q only affected a
regression model’s standard errors made a simple market-to-book
estimate seem even more attractive. In particular, the use of simplified
versions of Tobin’s q appeared to be a conservative means to avoid Type
I error (i.e., false positives) in estimating the determinants of firm
value. If scholars found a result when using a market-to-book estimate
such as Simple q, this argument went, the finding was both unbiased
and unlikely to be the result of chance.
For example, in studying the relationship between incorporation
in Delaware and firm value, Robert Daines used a market-to-book
version of Tobin’s q and made this very point for justifying its use:
“While more complex estimates of Tobin’s Q are possible, this simple
measure produces coefficient estimates whose signs are unbiased and
conservative in that they are less likely to produce significant results
(Perfect and Wiles, 1994).”119 In this fashion, the problems associated
117. See Daines, supra note 2, at 531 (citing Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 339); Kaplan
& Zingales, supra note 69, at 177 n.4 (citing Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, generally for the
conclusion that improvements to Simple q obtained by using alternative measures were fairly
limited); see also Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1052, 1067 (2010) (noting that, in
estimating Tobin’s q, they use the method employed in Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69).
118. See Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.
119. Daines, supra note 2, at 531; see also Gompers et al., supra note 117, at 1068 (noting that
measurement error in the book value denominator of their estimate of q “does inflate the residuals
and standard errors, making inference more difficult” but that “measurement error in the
dependent variable does not cause bias”).
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with simple market-to-book estimates of Tobin’s q documented by
Perfect and Wiles had been transformed into a feature rather than a
bug. Unfortunately, this sanguine conclusion does not hold when the
dependent variable is a ratio such as Simple q, where the denominator
is measured with error, as we discuss below and in the Appendix.120
Following the publication of Chung and Pruitt and Perfect and
Wiles, scholars continued to use a simplified market-to-book estimate
for Tobin’s q, occasionally making refinements to its precise
calculation.121 Surprisingly, they often cited Perfect and Wiles as
support for continuing to rely on a simplified market-to-book estimate
for Tobin’s q, even though the gist of Perfect and Wiles was that qs had
serious methodological flaws.
Especially notable in this regard was Steven Kaplan and Luigi
Zingales’s 1997 article, Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide
Useful Measures of Financing Constraints? Published in the prestigious
Quarterly Journal of Economics, the study sits squarely in the “Macro
q” literature in that it investigated and questioned previous findings
regarding the investment–cash flow sensitivities of firms.122 These
previous findings were based on a version of Tobin’s q derived from
estimates of replacement costs, following Brainard and Tobin’s original
formulation.
Yet Kaplan and Zingales instead used a simplified version of
Tobin’s q, grounding it in the market-to-book ratio examined in Perfect
and Wiles’s study. The precise definition, which would shape the course
of corporate governance research for the next two decades, was as
follows:
𝑞=

𝐴𝑇 + 𝑀𝑉𝐸 − 𝐵𝑉𝐸 − 𝐷𝑇
𝐴𝑇

where AT is the book value of assets, MVE is the market value of
common stock, BVE is the book value of common equity, and DT are
balance sheet deferred taxes.123 They justified their choice in a footnote,
noting that: “[Fazarri, Hubbard, and Peterson] compute Q based on
replacement costs, while we simply use a market-to-book ratio. The
results in Perfect and Wiles [1994] indicate that the improvements
obtained from the more involved computation of Q are fairly limited,
120. See also Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.
121. See Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 126; Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, at 170, 211–
12.
122. See Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, at 170, 211–12. The findings examined by Kaplan
and Zingales were originally published in Fazzari, Hubbard & Peterson, supra note 58.
123. See Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, at 177.
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particularly when regressions are estimated with firm fixed effects.”124
This formulation is the one we label Simple q.125
Note that the 1997 formulation by Kaplan and Zingales appears
to be consistent with Macro q because the denominator seems focused
on the value of assets and the left side of the balance sheet. In fact,
however, this formulation is equivalent to a simplistic version of Tobin’s
q in which the numerator and denominator are both derived on the right
side of the balance sheet. The reason stems from the fundamental
equation of accounting, which is that assets equal liabilities plus equity.
Specifically, AT = BVE + BVD, where BVD is the book value of debt,
defined as all liabilities. Given this equality, simple algebra yields the
following equivalent equation for Tobin’s q:

𝑞=

𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝐵𝑉𝐷 − 𝐷𝑇
𝐵𝑉𝐸 + 𝐵𝑉𝐷

The above equation is based exclusively on measures of a firm’s
outstanding securities: market value of equity and book values of equity
and debt. Some formulations of the above version of Simple q do not
include DT, balance sheet deferred taxes, and others add preferred
securities in addition to debt, but this formulation is analytically the
same. The key point here is that Simple q is not based on the market
value of assets divided by their replacement costs, but instead is based
on a simplified version of the market value of firm’s securities divided
by their book value.
Another historical strand in our story of Tobin’s q merits
exploration. While financial economists were adopting Simple q,
accounting academics were carefully studying the econometric
challenges that arose from “scale differences” in regressions when the
main dependent variable was the market value of firms’ capital. This
accounting literature was not specifically focused on Tobin’s q, but
rather considered the more general question of how to account properly
for the fact that firms vary in size. Just as one should not reach
conclusions about crime rates simply by comparing the number of
murders in New York to those in, say, Lawrence, Kansas, one should
adjust for the size of firms in any econometric tests with the market
value of firms’ capital as the dependent variable. Simple q was, in a
124. Id. at 177 n.4.
125. As discussed below, academic studies occasionally use this calculation of Tobin’s q but do
not deduct deferred taxes from the numerator. See infra notes 131–132 and accompanying text
(citing several representative examples of Simple q calculations from recent academic literature).
Given the modest effect of deferred taxes on the overall calculation of Simple q, we include these
studies as among those that use Simple q.
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way, a crude attempt to make such adjustments, by scaling the market
value of firms’ capital by their book value. But the accounting literature
undertook a more comprehensive and nuanced approach.
Specifically, one year before the publication of Kaplan and
Zingales’s paper, Mary Barth and Sanjay Kallapur published an
important study of the effects of the bias that resulted from scale
differences in regressions using the market values of firms’ equity as a
dependent variable.126 Barth and Kallapur did not limit their analysis
to the use of book value as a potential scaling factor in the way that the
finance literature did with market-to-book estimates of q; in fact, their
article did not even mention Tobin’s q. Instead, their focus was on how,
generally, regressions with the market value of firms’ equity as the
dependent variable should take into account differences in scale.127
During the following two decades, the accounting literature has
continued to develop and refine this general approach to scale
adjustments.128 Interestingly, the concept of Tobin’s q does not appear
to have arisen in this literature, perhaps because accounting scholars
were not part of the historical devolution of Tobin’s q into Simple q and
accordingly did not consider whether one might study Tobin’s q as a
dependent variable instead of studying market values directly (and
then addressing challenges related to scale adjustments). The
accounting literature implicitly rejected, or at least ignored, Tobin’s q
as a method of scaling the market value of firms’ capital and instead
studied other, less problematic approaches.
Apparently, neither corporate law scholars nor empirical finance
scholars noticed these developments in the accounting literature.
Instead of considering the accounting literature’s new empirical
techniques, during the two decades after the publication of Kaplan and
Zingales’s study, law and finance scholars have simply used Simple q.
Indeed, the use of Simple q in corporate governance scholarship became
de rigueur after the publication of Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew
Metrick’s widely cited 2003 article in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics, entitled Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Notably,

126. See Barth & Kallapur, supra note 25 (concluding that “the most effective remedy” for
scale differences “is to include a scale proxy as an independent variable and report inferences based
on White standard errors”).
127. See id. at 528 (“We seek to provide evidence on the extent of scale-related econometric
problems in accounting research contexts and the effectiveness of available remedies.”).
128. See, e.g., Barth & Clinch, supra note 25, at 253–54 (assessing simulations of the effects of
firm size in regressions based on market values); Ohlson & Kim, supra note 25, at 398–99
(discussing modifications of market-value-based regressions to account for scale).

Bartlett & Partnoy_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2020]

THE MISUSE OF TOBIN’S Q

3/13/2020 2:12 PM

385

Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s sole source of authority for using Simple
q was Kaplan and Zingales’s 1997 paper.129
During recent years, articles in which Simple q is the dependent
variable have continued to appear in the academic literature. We
conclude this Part with a few representative examples. For instance,
Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman, and Venky Nagar begin
their definitions discussion with the following straightforward
paragraph: “Our measure of firm value is Tobin’s Q (Q). We define Q as
the ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value of
assets, both computed at the end of each fiscal year.”130 Their precise
calculation of Tobin’s q tracks the version used by Kaplan and Zingales,
based on market and book values of securities, except that their
numerator does not include a deduction for balance sheet deferred
taxes. Likewise, Martijn Cremers and Allen Ferrell write in a footnote:
“We interpret a higher average Q, measured as the ratio of book value
of firm assets to market capitalization, as evidence that the firm uses
its resources more productively and efficiently, in line with the
literature.”131 Merritt Fox, Ronald Gilson, and Darius Palia call Simple
q “the typical measure of a firm’s success at creating value.”132 In
adopting this definition, they include a footnote discussing the potential
problems that its use creates; nevertheless, they conclude: “Tobin’s Q is
still, however, a reasonable way of looking for a historical period of time
to see which firms on average did better at creating value and which
did worse.”133 As these statements suggest, many of the most important
recent questions in corporate law have been addressed by studies that
rely on Simple q.
That brings our story up to date. Today, Simple q has become
the accepted and central dependent variable in corporate law and
129. See Gompers et al., supra note 5, at 126 (citing Kaplan & Zingales, supra note 69, as the
basis for using Simple q).
130. Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman & Venky Nagar, Exit as Governance: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 J. FIN. 2515, 2524 (2013); see also id. at app. (defining Q).
131. Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 69
J. FIN. 1167, 1168 n.2 (2014). Cremers and Ferrell calculate q using the formula set forth in Kaplan
and Zingales, supra note 69, at 177. See Cremers & Ferrell, supra, at 1173 n.9 (describing their
formula for calculating q). One additional data question is whether the market price of a firm’s
stock is determined as of the end of a firm’s fiscal year or the end of the calendar year.
132. Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson & Darius Palia, Corporate Governance Changes as a
Signal: Contextualizing the Performance Link 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working
Paper No. 323 & Stanford Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 496, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2807926
[https://perma.cc/T7R4-UYKS].
Similar to Bharath, Jayaraman & Nagar, supra note 130, Fox, Gilson, and Palia define Tobin’s q
using the same formula as Kaplan and Zingales, supra note 69, but omit any deduction in the
numerator for deferred taxes. See Fox et al., supra, at 10 n.24 (describing the method used to
calculate Tobin’s q).
133. Fox et al., supra note 132, at 11 n.25.
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related scholarship. Notwithstanding some criticism,134 it has become
standard practice for scholars to assert, without further explanation,
not only that Simple q is an acceptable measure of Tobin’s q but also
that it is an appropriate measure of firm value.135
II. THE CASE AGAINST USING SIMPLE Q
For some readers, the peculiar intellectual journey of Tobin’s q
will be reason enough to question its reliability as a proxy for firm value
in the literature. But we also want to present a more specific case
against using any version of Tobin’s q—and particularly Simple q—as
such a proxy.
First, we pause to ask whether it makes theoretical sense to
assume that Tobin’s q, in any formulation, measures the value of
corporations. Our basic answer is no. The problem is that a high value
of Tobin’s q does not necessarily mean that a corporation is more
valuable in any meaningful way.
Second, we focus on the problem of measurement error with
respect to Simple q. Although the literature frequently ignores the
measurement error problems associated with using simple market-tobook estimates for Tobin’s q, many of the problems have been
scrutinized in the macroeconomics literature. We explore why
measurement errors are likely to create biased estimates in regressions
with Simple q as a dependent variable.
Third, we examine recent advances in the asset pricing
literature that raise questions about the very meaning of Simple q.
Specifically, the book-to-market ratio (similar to the reciprocal of
Simple q, except that it is calculated as a firm’s book value divided by
the market value of equity, instead of the full capital structure) has
been a risk factor in prominent asset pricing models. As we illustrate
below, firms that have a high level of Simple q (and therefore typically
a low book-to-market ratio) are likely to experience relatively low future
134. See, e.g., Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong & José A. Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes:
Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms, 70 J. FIN. 839, 870 (2015) (citing the “substantial
empirical debate about whether traditional measures such as market-to-book or Tobin’s q
adequately capture growth options”).
135. See, e.g., Ran Duchin, Amir Goldberg & Denis Sosyura, Spillovers Inside Conglomerates:
Incentives and Capital, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 1696 (2017) (using Simple q to assess the impact of pay
changes within divisions of firms); T. Clifton Green & Russell Jame, Company Name Fluency,
Investor Recognition, and Firm Value, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 813 (2013) (concluding that “firms with
more fluent names have significantly higher Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratios”); Byoung-Hyoun
Hwang & Hugh Hoikwang Kim, It Pays to Write Well, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 373 (2017) (using Simple
q to conclude that easier-to-read disclosure documents are associated with higher firm valuation);
Antoinette Schoar & Luo Zuo, Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO
Careers and Management Styles, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 1425 (2017) (using Simple q to assess CEOs).
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returns, and vice versa. This finding suggests that scholars should be
more careful in reaching conclusions about firms with higher measures
of Simple q.
To be clear, our claim here is not that Tobin’s q can never be an
acceptable proxy for firm value. Rather, our goal is to establish why
scholars who make assertions about the value of corporations based on
a positive relationship between Simple q and a variable of interest bear
a heavy burden of persuasion, a burden we believe they have not met.
A. Interpretive Error
First, it is worth taking a moment to ask what the original
formulation of Tobin’s q measures. According to Tobin, when q is high,
the market value of an asset—call it a widget—held by a firm is greater
than its replacement cost. In other words, the perception among market
participants is that this asset is more valuable than the cost of replacing
it. If this perception is accurate, and a firm can increase the scale of its
operations, it follows that the firm should invest in widgets, and
continue to invest, until the market value of widgets is equal to their
replacement cost—that is, until q is equal to one.
However, it does not follow from this analysis that firms with
relatively high Tobin’s q have relatively high value or that they will
even retain a high level of Tobin’s q. To the contrary, according to the
original macroeconomic theory, the Tobin’s q of any given firm should
revert to one in the future.136 Additionally, to the extent the market
value of a firm’s assets is greater than their replacement value, high
Tobin’s q firms could face declining profit opportunities. (Widgets might
become more expensive due to increased demand, or competitors might
recognize the profit opportunities associated with widgets.)
Alternatively, under the q theory of investment, Tobin’s q might exceed
one for a sustained period of time because of high adjustment costs.
Indeed, these adjustment costs could vary systematically with the type
of assets owned by a firm. For instance, Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor
find that intangible assets have convex adjustment costs that are
roughly twice as high as those for physical assets, suggesting that firms

136. Moreover, the disconnect between the market value of a firm’s assets and their
replacement value might be due to short-term market opportunities or to behavioral effects on
market prices. High q can also be consistent with lower expected returns (i.e., a lower cost of
capital). We explore the relationship between q and equity returns in Section II.C.
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with large amounts of intangible assets may take longer to respond to
investment opportunities implied by a high Tobin’s q.137
In theory, a high Tobin’s q firm could even reflect poor
management. Indeed, as Philip Dybvig and Mitch Warachka note, a
high Tobin’s q could result from inefficient underinvestment (and
accordingly a failure to maximize firm value) given that additional
investment should drive q towards one.138 Dybvig and Warachka’s
critique of Tobin’s q is more narrowly circumscribed than ours: they
focus on developing a theoretical critique of Tobin’s q and assessing
measures of operating efficiency as a potential substitute.139
Nevertheless, it is striking that Dybvig and Warachka’s paper has not
only remained unpublished since it was posted online in 2010, but also
has been mostly ignored within the law and finance literature.140

137. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 253. As Peters and Taylor note, one possible
explanation for the higher adjustment costs associated with intangible assets could reflect the fact
that adjusting intangible capital often requires replacing specialized employees. Id.
138. See Philip H. Dybvig & Mitch Warachka, Tobin’s q Does Not Measure Firm Performance:
Theory,
Empirics,
and
Alternatives
(Mar.
2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1562444 [https://perma.cc/QT7T-DBDR] (performing an empirical
analysis demonstrating that Tobin’s q is not a proxy for firm performance). As a simple example,
Dybvig and Warachka posit a firm with a market value of $15 based on $10 of investment, yielding
a q of 1.5. See id. at 2. If expanding the firm’s scale through a $20 investment increased its market
value by $24, the firm’s q would decline to 1.3 but its market value would increase by $4. Id.
139. See id. at 2–3 (deriving a theoretical framework to demonstrate the conflicting
implications of better performance on Tobin’s q and developing two new operating efficiency
measures focusing on scale efficiency and cost discipline).
140. For instance, while nearly 400 papers discuss Tobin’s q within Westlaw, see supra note
9, only four papers within Westlaw could be located that cite Dybvig and Warachka’s paper. To
determine these figures, we conducted a search in the Westlaw “Law Reviews & Journals”
database for “Dybvig /4 Warachka.” Dybvig and Warachka’s paper was cited twice in 2018 in
conjunction with an unpublished version of this paper to point out that there are critiques of
Tobin’s q. See Amihud et al., supra note 3, at 1483 n.24 (citing Dybvig and Warachka as “a critique
of the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value”); Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An
Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
852, 895 n.115 (“Tobin’s Q has, in any event, been seriously questioned as a means of measuring
the effect of corporate governance changes on firm performance in both the financial and legal
literature.”). But of the two papers before 2018, one paper dismisses the study in a footnote as “an
unpublished paper,” see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1102 n.53 (2015), and the other cites it once for
the proposition that the use of q as a measure of company performance “has been subject to
criticism,” see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 462 n.39 (2014).
In addition, we are aware of one paper within the corporate governance literature that also cites
Dybvig and Warachka. See Klausner, supra note 9, at 18 (citing Dybvig and Warachka for the
proposition that q “is considered by some economists to be an unreliable measure of value”).
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Finally, the theoretical interpretation of Tobin’s q as a measure
of the value of corporations is misplaced for econometric reasons as well.
The standard “q regression” generally takes the following form:
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑄 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑋 + 𝜖
where 𝛽 is an estimated intercept, X represents a regressor of interest,
𝛽 represents the regression coefficient that estimates the association
of the regressor with Simple q, and 𝜖 is the error term. (A typical q
regression also includes a vector of control variables, which we omit
without loss of generality.) Now consider the two primary statistical
justifications for using a ratio such as Tobin’s q as an outcome variable
of interest.141
In the first instance, the variable of interest is a specific measure
such as firm value, but a researcher may be concerned about scale
effects, as has been studied in the accounting literature.142 As is well
known within statistics,143 the researcher could control for scale effects
by dividing every variable in the regression equation (i.e., both left-side
and right-side variables, including the intercept) by a scaling factor. In
the context of estimating the market value of a firm, for instance, a
researcher would divide every variable by a scale factor such as book
value, thus resulting in Simple q as the outcome variable. However, we
are unaware of a single paper in empirical corporate finance that
justifies its reliance on either Tobin’s q or Simple q in this fashion or
that divides every variable in the regression equation by the scaling
factor. Rather, researchers uniformly apply the specification noted
above, which omits estimating a coefficient for the ratio 1/(Book Value)
and typically includes only nonratio regressors (i.e., X is not divided by
book value).144
In the second instance, the variable of interest to the researcher
is supposed to be the ratio itself, which is believed to be of independent
141. See Robert Wiseman, On the Use and Misuse of Ratios in Strategic Management Research,
in 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT 75 (Donald D. Bergh & David J.
Ketchen eds., 2009). Wiseman notes that there are three rationales for using a ratio as an outcome
variable: deflating a variable of interest to be a rate, deflating a variable of interest to be a
proportion, and examining a ratio that is of independent theoretical interest. Id. at 76–80. Given
that the first two rationales reflect the same concern about scale effects, this leaves two principle
reasons researchers utilize ratios as outcome variables.
142. See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text (discussing the accounting literature’s
focus on accounting for differences in scale amongst firms when examining the predictors of a
firm’s market value of equity).
143. See Richard Kronmal, Spurious Correlation and the Fallacy of the Ratio Standard
Revisited, 156 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 379, 381 (1993) (outlining the process of controlling for a
deflator: dividing both the dependent and independent variables by a common factor).
144. We discuss these challenges in greater detail in Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.
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theoretical interest (e.g., Tobin’s q is purported to be a proxy for
monopoly power, firm performance, or some other construct). The
researcher therefore chooses to estimate the relationship between a
particular predictor of interest and the ratio. In so doing, however, the
researcher is effectively examining whether the effect of the predictor
on the numerator of the ratio is moderated by the ratio’s denominator.
Imagine, for instance, a researcher who seeks to examine the effect of a
staggered board on Simple q using the specification noted in the
equation above. In such a scenario, the regression will estimate the
effect on Simple q’s numerator (an estimate of the market value of the
firm) from the interaction of the staggered board variable and the
denominator of Simple q (the book value of assets). The reasons arise
from basic principles of linear regression, yet this interpretative
challenge, as well as other assumptions this estimation approach
entails, are not even mentioned in papers that use some version of
Tobin’s q as a proxy for firm value.145
B. Measurement Error in Simple Q
We now turn to some aspects of measurement error that are
problematic for studies that rely on Simple q to assess the relationship
between corporate law and the value of corporations. We begin this
critique by revisiting the Perfect and Wiles study of five different
formulations of Tobin’s q. Recall that scholars have cited Perfect and
Wiles as justifying the use of market-to-book estimates of q, such as
Simple q. That reliance on Perfect and Wiles has been based on two
generally unstated assumptions: that alternative measures of Tobin’s q
would not significantly improve measurement accuracy and that the
measurement errors associated with market-to-book estimates are not
problematic. As we demonstrate, both of these assumptions are
incorrect.
1. Evidence of Measurement Error
As we note above, Perfect and Wiles compared a market-to-book
estimate of q, labeled qs, to four other estimates of Tobin’s q. They
calculated these four other estimates using more detailed techniques
than simply dividing the market value of a firm by its book value,
including more accurate estimates of replacement value that capture
changes in prices, depreciation, and technology, as well as first-in, first-

145. See id.
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out (“FIFO”) versus last-in, first-out (“LIFO”) inventory methods.146 For
instance, some of these other estimates of Tobin’s q took advantage of a
Securities and Exchange Commission requirement, effective from
1976–1979, that large firms report annual estimates of the replacement
costs of plant, equipment, and inventories, as well as depreciation and
cost of goods sold, and a similar requirement, effective from 1980–1985,
arising from Financial Accounting Standard No. 33.147
Perfect and Wiles found that although their estimates of Tobin’s
q generally were highly correlated with one another,148 the estimate for
qs had a significantly larger mean and median, and generated
significantly different values for particular firms than estimates for the
other four.149 For example, they tested how similar the five Tobin’s q
estimates were in grouping a sample of 558 firms into two categories:
Tobin’s q greater than one versus Tobin’s q less than one.150 The simple
estimate of qs agreed with the other estimates in only 79.4 percent to
82.8 percent of cases.151 In other words, for roughly one in five firms,
the simple estimate of qs was not even precise enough to correspond
with other measures in categorizing a firm’s q as above or below one.
Perfect and Wiles concluded: “Thus, although qs is relatively simple to
construct, it does not produce sorting results that are comparable to the
other four estimators.”152 To repeat, Perfect and Wiles concluded that a
market-to-book estimate of Tobin’s q did not produce comparable
results to four alternative formulations of Tobin’s q. That is not the
ringing endorsement of their market-to-book estimate that many
scholars have assumed.
The literature’s citation to Perfect and Wiles as justifying the
use of market-to-book estimates of q is all the more puzzling in light of
additional studies documenting that, of all the estimates of Tobin’s q,
market-to-book estimates perform among the worst. In their
comprehensive empirical estimation of measurement error in Tobin’s q,
Timothy Erickson and Toni Whited note that different approaches to
146. See Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 324–32 (detailing the derivation of the different
proxies for q).
147. See id. at 326 (discussing the rationale for choosing the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Financial Accounting Standards Board standards as estimates of asset
replacement cost). Interestingly, firms generally included disclaimers along with these reported
estimates, indicating that the managers believed the replacement value data were “of limited value
because of the subjective judgments necessarily involved in making these estimates.” Id. at 326
n.13.
148. Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients for the measures ranged from 0.9045 to 0.9856.
Id. at 334. Correlations among changes in q were lower, in the range of 0.8503 to 0.9404. Id.
149. See id. at 332–34 (describing the various q ratio estimates).
150. Id. at 335 tbl.7.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 335.
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calculating Tobin’s q yield nearly two hundred different estimates of
“Macro q” and two hundred different estimates of “Finance q.”153 (Recall
that macroeconomists have been using a version of Tobin’s q that more
closely resembles Brainard and Tobin’s original conception, whereas
financial economists have adapted Tobin’s q in ways that make it easier
to calculate.)
In a series of studies, Erickson and Whited have demonstrated
several serious drawbacks to a market-to-book estimate, including
biases that result from measurement error. Following Hayashi and
Inoue, they question whether the basic assumption of perfect
substitutability holds for such a simplified estimate of q, which
aggregates all of a firm’s assets.154
Erickson and Whited do not mince words: they find that “the
most common proxy used in the finance literature, the market to book
ratio, only explains about forty percent of the variation in average q.”155
They conclude that the ratio’s “measurement error problem must
therefore stem more from issues such as aggregation and unobservable
assets.”156 Later studies have confirmed Erickson and Whited’s
findings; for example, Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor similarly find
that “market-to-book-assets ratios are especially poor proxies” for the
true theoretical Tobin’s q.157
These problems with market-to-book proxies are also evidenced
by the extent to which datasets including market-to-book ratios have
extreme outliers, both high and low. Although scholars commonly
exclude these outliers, even a cursory review of them suggests a number
of puzzling findings. For example, in his study of Delaware law and firm
value, Robert Daines eliminated the top and bottom one percent of firmlevel measurements of a market-to-book estimate of Tobin’s q, claiming
that the effect of Delaware corporate law was unlikely to explain high
or low Tobin’s q values.158
However, using Simple q to estimate q, Guhan Subramanian
found that the one percent lower and upper ranges in a sample of firms
resembling Daine’s were 0.38 and 70.49, respectively, for the relevant
periods.159 Such levels of Tobin’s q are extreme: it would be interesting

153. See Erickson & Whited, supra note 80, at 12.
154. See Erickson & Whited, Treating, supra note 112, at 1325.
155. Timothy Erickson & Toni M. Whited, On the Information Content of Different Measures
of Q 22 (August 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
156. Id. at 23.
157. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 252 (referencing similar findings to Erickson and
Whited).
158. See Daines, supra note 2, at 530.
159. See Subramanian, supra note 2, at 39.
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to know why a firm with a Tobin’s q of 0.38 had not been liquidated, or
why a firm with a Tobin’s q of 70.49 had such a measure (and what it
meant), perhaps because it was small or idiosyncratic in some way.
Subramanian’s analysis suggests that the distribution of Simple q
includes a significant number of extreme, outlier values, particularly in
samples that include small firms. (As Subramanian notes, Enron’s
Simple q at the height of its stock market valuation was 6.8.160)
Unfortunately, the literature generally does not focus on the analysis
or impact of Simple q outliers.
Simple q generates such extreme outliers in part because of
questionable assumptions with regard to both the numerator and the
denominator utilized in estimating Simple q. With respect to the
numerator, Simple q requires an estimate of the market value of a
firm’s assets. However, Simple q seeks to estimate these values based
on the market values of all of a firm’s outstanding securities, and these
values are often not observable aside from a company’s outstanding
common stock (assuming it is publicly traded). Market values for a
firm’s other securities, such as outstanding debt and preferred stock,
are instead typically estimated from book values, which can diverge
from their fair value. As a result, the Simple q numerator is not based
on an assessment of individual assets, or even categories of assets, on
the left-hand side of the balance sheet; instead, it simply reflects the
book values of capital on the right-hand side.
More problematic still is the calculation of the denominator,
which originally reflected the replacement value of a firm’s assets.
Simple q substitutes basic accounting measures in its denominator. In
particular, it uses a company’s book value of equity and debt as a proxy
for the replacement value of assets. The use of book values virtually
guarantees that the denominator will depart from the replacement cost
of assets theorized by Tobin and Brainard. In a 1997 study examining
measurement error in proxies for Tobin’s q, Wilbur Lewellen and S.G.
Badrinath demonstrated that various conceptions of q differed
significantly by using cases in which asset replacement costs, the
original Tobin’s q denominator, were known.161 They found that revised
q ratios based on actual replacement costs varied from book-valuebased estimates in the literature by ten percent to twenty percent.162
The methodologies Lewellen and Badrinath used require considerable
information, attention, and work, and they require data that are not

160. Id.
161. See Wilbur G. Lewellen & S.G. Badrinath, On the Measurement of Tobin’s q, 44 J. FIN.
ECON. 77 (1997).
162. See id. at 121.
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typically accessible to researchers. Obviously, it is much easier to
calculate Simple q based on available Compustat data, and scholars
have preferred the easier route. Measurement errors are an inevitable
result.
Book values have become especially subject to measurement
error given the importance of intangible assets and financial
engineering. Even assets as simple as a firm’s property, plant, and
equipment (“PPE”) are recorded at historical cost less depreciation,
which will vary depending on the depreciation schedule adopted by a
firm and inevitably will diverge from market values. The value of
inventory generally will reflect the lower of historical cost or fair value,
and the inventory balance similarly will depend on whether sales of
inventory are treated under FIFO or LIFO accounting. More complex
assets are not part of book value at all. For example, unbooked
intangible assets are increasingly important to firm value but are not
reflected on balance sheets. Likewise, financial derivatives and
unconsolidated subsidiaries can be important to the market value of a
firm’s securities but are not included in book value.
Given these measurement problems, Erickson and Whited’s
finding that market-to-book measures of Tobin’s q perform poorly is not
surprising. For the same reasons, Simple q inevitably is subject to
significant measurement error due to the problems of asset aggregation
and unobservability.
2. Measurement Error and Bias
In their study of Tobin’s q, Perfect and Wiles used each of the
five estimates of Tobin’s q as an outcome variable and regressed each
one on a variety of firm characteristics, much as empirical finance
scholars do today in corporate governance research.163 Perfect and Wiles
found that the regression coefficients for the simple version, qs, differed
significantly from those obtained using other measures of q.164 Although
scholars have subsequently cited Perfect and Wiles to support their use
of Simple q insofar that it resembles qs, Perfect and Wiles warned that
qs could lead to biased estimates: “In summary, the results indicate that
using qs produces regression estimates that often differ from those
found using the other four q ratio estimates, while qB, qLR, qPW, and qQH
produce comparable regression estimates.”165 Their message was clear:
beware of using Simple q as a dependent variable.
163. See Perfect & Wiles, supra note 102, at 314.
164. See id. at 336.
165. Id. at 338. Perfect and Wiles suggested a more optimistic view of qs in one paragraph near
the end of their article, though they also make it clear that there were limitations associated with
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Notwithstanding these warnings, there might have been some
reasons for scholars not to worry. The fact that Simple q is measured
with error might pose only a minor inconvenience if classical
measurement error assumptions held. Under the classical errors-invariables model, errors in the variable of interest are assumed to be
independent of the true measure of the variable. To the extent this
assumption holds, measurement errors in a dependent variable do not
lead to biased estimates of regression coefficients; the only consequence
of the presence of measurement errors in the dependent variable is that
they inflate the standard errors of these coefficient estimates.166 As
noted above, this approach to measurement error has led some scholars
to view Simple q regressions as conservative because measurement
error reduces the risk of Type I error (i.e., false positives).167
The question remains, however, whether the assumptions of the
classical errors-in-variables model hold. There are two technical
reasons why they might not: problems with aggregation and problems
with omitted variables. There is also one more general, fundamental,
and unavoidable reason why the classical assumptions are unlikely to
hold: Tobin’s q is a ratio. We discuss each of these issues in turn.
First, the aggregation of assets can result in nonclassical
measurement error. Consider, for instance, a simple firm that has only
two types of assets: current assets and capital assets (i.e., property,
plant and equipment). Under U.S. accounting rules, the book value of
current assets is generally their fair value, meaning that the market
value of current assets roughly equals their book value, so that the
market-to-book ratio for current assets is typically close to one.
In contrast, the book value of capital assets is their cost less
depreciation. As a result, the market value of capital assets frequently
this conclusion, which related to an additional estimation of the regression models using changes
in q. See id. at 338–39. They cautioned that the similarity of the regression coefficients in such a
specification was not surprising given that changes in common stock values should drive the
changes in the q estimates, but concluded nevertheless that
[i]f, however, changes in the q estimates are used, then the empirical results do not, in
general, reveal significant differences among the estimators. An implication of this
result is, of course, that qs, due to its ease of construction, may be an attractive
estimator when changes in a firm’s q ratio are of interest.
Id. at 339.
166. To illustrate, assume that we seek to understand whether x predicts y in a standard
regression framework. The true measure, 𝑦 ∗ , is related to the regressor 𝑥 as 𝑦 ∗ = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑥 + 𝜖 .
However, the outcome variable is measured with random error vi. Thus, 𝑦 = 𝑦 ∗ + 𝑣 , where vi
represents random measurement error that is uncorrelated with 𝑦 ∗ and 𝑥 . Under these conditions,
measurement error in the dependent variable does not lead to biased estimates of the regression
coefficient 𝛽 , as can be seen by rewriting the model in 𝑦 : 𝑦 = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑥 + 𝜖 + 𝑣 . Because both 𝜖
and 𝑣 are assumed to be independent of 𝑥 , measurement error affects only the standard errors of
the regression coefficient estimate, 𝛽 .
167. See discussion supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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will differ from their book value, depending on whether the assets
decline in value by more or less than their depreciation schedule. In
some cases, the market-to-book ratio might be greater than one; in other
cases it will be less than one.
Moreover, the market might place a higher value on current
assets than on capital assets, because current assets can be deployed
more quickly. In short, there are any number of reasons why the
expected market-to-book ratios for these two classes of assets might
differ, regardless of how well a firm is managed. Moreover, firms are
likely to differ systematically in the extent to which their assets are
comprised of current assets. For these reasons, aggregating assets can
cause Simple q to be biased in nonrandom ways, and failure to account
for this fact might lead to biased estimates of the predictors of
Simple q.
In Appendix A, Table A.1, we show that this concern is not
merely theoretical.168 We estimate the extent to which a firm’s level of
current assets is associated with its measure of Simple q. We find that
it is: a firm’s level of current assets is positively associated with a firm’s
Simple q even after controlling for industry- and firm-fixed effects. In
other words, the market attributes a higher Simple q-ratio to firms with
larger amounts of current assets.
The implications of this finding are troubling to the extent one
is interested in understanding the determinants of Simple q. Because
Simple q aggregates all assets (including current assets) it will be
upwardly biased to the extent a firm has current assets. Moreover, the
fact that this finding persists despite industry- and firm-fixed effects
illustrates how this bias can vary within industries and firms. To the
extent this variation is correlated with other firm characteristics, it can
create biased estimates of the association of these characteristics with
Simple q. A researcher might think they have spotted a relationship
between some aspect of corporate law and firm value, but in fact the
relationship between Simple q and the corporate law variable could be
due, at least in part, to the correlation between the corporate law
variable and a firm’s holding of current assets.
Second, the omission of variables can result in nonclassical
measurement error. Consider intangible assets. A firm’s expenditures
to develop knowledge, intellectual property, or software are typically
recorded on a company’s income statement as a research and
development expense rather than capitalized on a company’s balance

168. See infra app. A, tbl. A.1.
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sheet as an asset.169 In contrast, when a firm purchases an intangible
asset, such as by acquiring another company or a patent, the firm
generally capitalizes the asset on the balance sheet at the purchase
price as part of a line entry for “Intangible Assets.”170 To the extent such
intangibles are separately identifiable (e.g., particular patents,
noncompetition agreements, etc.), they are separately recorded as
“Other Intangible Assets,” with the residual balance of the purchase
price being booked to “Goodwill,” which can be subsequently written
down if these values are deemed “impaired” by management.
In other words, two firms can have radically different book
values based on the extent to which they “build” rather than “buy” their
intangible assets, as well as the extent to which they reflect a
manufacturing firm (where PPE is likely to be large) relative to a
service firm (where PPE is likely to be small and intangibles more
important). Moreover, these systematic accounting differences among
service firms have become more important over time as the U.S.
economy has shifted toward service- and technology-based industries,
which has made intangible assets such as human capital, innovative
products, brands, patents, software, customer relationships, databases,
and distribution systems increasingly important.171 In their 2010 study,
Carol Corrado and Charles Hulten estimate that intangible capital
makes up thirty-four percent of firms’ total capital in recent years.172
Simple q can be skewed upward given that it substitutes book
value of capital for the replacement cost of assets, including intangible
assets. Indeed, Simple q is by definition biased upward by research and
development, brand management, and human capital, which are
reflected in the market value of a firm’s capital, but not its book value.
As Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny recognized: “Tobin’s Q is high when the
firm has valuable intangible assets in addition to physical capital, such
as monopoly power [Lindenberg and Ross (1981)], goodwill, a stock of
patents, or good managers.”173
The measurement error arising from the omission of intangibles
also can lead to biased regression estimates. In Appendix A, Table A.2,
we test this bias formally using an empirical estimate of a firm’s
169. When Do Intangible Assets Appear on the Balance Sheet?, ACCOUNTINGTOOLS (Oct. 8,
2019),
https://www.accountingtools.com/articles/when-do-intangible-assets-appear-on-thebalance-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/FVF6-WPQ7] (“[I]f a company conducts expensive research
for many years and eventually creates a valuable patent from this research, all of the associated
cost is charged to expense as incurred - no intangible asset can be capitalized.”).
170. Id.
171. See Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a “Technological
Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 99, 99 (2010).
172. See id. at 102 tbl.1.
173. Morck et al., supra note 6, at 296.
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intangible capital that Ryan Peters and Lucian Taylor have developed
based on the firm’s prior expenditures on research and development
plus prior selling, general, and administrative expenditures.174 With
this estimate, Peters and Taylor calculated a modified version of Tobin’s
q for all firms in the Compustat database from 1950 through 2015,
which they refer to as Total q.175 Writing in the “Macro q” tradition, they
find that Total q is associated with total investment (i.e., investment in
both physical and intangible capital).176
Importantly, the Peters and Taylor dataset includes their
estimate of the replacement value of intangible capital that is not
reflected on a firm’s balance sheet.177 Using these data, we estimate the
extent to which the omission of intangible property from a firm’s
reported book value of assets creates bias in Simple q. As with current
assets, we find in Appendix A, Table A.2 that a firm’s level of intangible
assets is positively associated with a firm’s Simple q even after
controlling for industry- and firm-fixed effects.
Put simply, the failure of book value to capture a firm’s
investment in intangible property results in the systematic upward bias
of Simple q for firms that make larger intangible property investments.
This result has intuitive support: markets likely place some value on a
firm’s intangible capital (thus increasing the numerator used in Simple
q), yet Simple q fails to account for the replacement costs of these assets
(thus biasing downward the denominator for Simple q). To provide a
concrete example: in 2010, Microsoft had a Simple q of 3.27 but a Total

174. See infra app. A, tbl. A.2; see also Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 252:
We interpret research and development (R&D) spending as an investment in knowledge
capital, and we apply the perpetual-inventory method to a firm’s past R&D to measure
the replacement cost of its knowledge capital. We similarly interpret a fraction of past
selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) spending as an investment in organization
capital, which includes human capital, brand, customer relationships, and distribution
systems.
175. Formally, Peters and Taylor calculate Total q as the following:
𝑞

=

𝑉
𝐾

+𝐾

where 𝑞 is their measure for Total q for each firm i as of the end of fiscal year t, 𝑉 is the market
value of outstanding equity plus the book value of debt less the firm’s current assets in year t, 𝐾
is the book value of the firm’s PPE in year t, and 𝐾 is their estimate for the replacement cost of
the firm’s intangible capital in year t. Id. at 252.
176. See id. at 260 (“[T]otal q explains intangible investment slightly better than physical
investment in our full sample, and it explains total investment even better.”).
177. See id. at 256–57 (explaining the methodology for measuring the replacement value of
intangible assets).
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q of 1.77, largely due to the fact that its book value of $86 billion did not
reflect an estimated $54 billion of intangible assets.178
As with current assets, the coefficient bias that arises because
intangible assets are excluded from Simple q can affect the results of
empirical studies. A researcher might think they have spotted a
relationship between some aspect of corporate law and firm value, but
in fact the relationship between Simple q and the corporate law variable
could be due, at least in part, to the correlation between the corporate
law variable and the level of a firm’s intangible assets.
Finally, the fact that Simple q is a ratio rules out conventional
approaches to addressing the bias created by either aggregation of
assets or the omission of assets from book value. For instance, in many
contexts where a dependent variable is measured with error, simply
adding as a regressor a control variable that proxies for the
mismeasurement error can diminish any possible bias. However, this
approach is not possible when the outcome variable is a ratio with a
mismeasured denominator. The intuition can be seen by comparing the
following two equations:
𝑦∗ + 𝜇
∗

=𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑋 +𝜖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑋 +𝜖

(A)
(B)

If 𝜇 represents measurement error, “controlling” for it in a
regression framework effectively means moving it from the left-hand
side of the equation to the right-hand side. In equation (A), we can do
so by subtracting 𝜇 from both sides of the equation (in a regression
setting, this is accomplished by adding a control variable to proxy for
it), leaving the other variables (𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑋 + 𝜖 ) unaffected. In contrast,
equation (B) requires us to multiply both sides of the equation by
𝜃 +𝜇
𝜃
This would transform all right-side variables by the same ratio,
creating a host of econometric problems in the process. In related work,
we explore this empirical challenge in more detail and provide a method
to address the problem of measurement error in the denominator of a
178. We calculate Microsoft’s Simple q using Compustat data for Microsoft’s 2010 fiscal year;
we obtain Microsoft’s 2010 Total q from the Peters and Taylor dataset available at WHARTON RES.
DATA SERVS., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/
FNA9-APVT].
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ratio such as Simple q.179 The bottom line is that simply adding a control
for 𝜇 will not control for the bias arising from mismeasurement of the
denominator in equation (B). Remarkably, this basic arithmetical
problem with addressing measurement error in Simple q has gone
unnoticed in both the finance and legal literatures.
In short, scholars who rely on Simple q face a serious problem of
measurement error bias. They cannot find solace in the argument that
although any measurement error in the outcome variable (e.g., Simple
q) might create large standard errors when estimating treatment
effects, it does not otherwise create biased estimates of these treatment
effects. As noted, that argument assumes the measurement error in
Simple q conforms to the classical errors-in-variable model—an
assumption that is inappropriate when measurement error is
nonrandom and when it affects a ratio that is an outcome variable.
C. Q and Equity Returns
We conclude this Part by pointing out an interesting puzzle:
firms with high Simple q have lower future equity returns, and vice
versa. This empirical relationship is robust, as we demonstrate below.
We hope researchers who draw conclusions about corporate law and
corporate governance based on Tobin’s q will take notice of this point
and engage with the puzzle. We expect that scholars will interpret our
results in a variety of ways; we do not want to dictate their response.
Our goal here is simply to set forth the empirical relationship between
q and returns and provide some potential interpretations; it is not to
resolve the puzzle definitively.
To conduct our empirical analysis, we used historical stock price
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (“CRSP”) to
construct two equally weighted stock portfolios for each January from
1980 through 2009, and we evaluated these portfolios for the following
twelve months. In the first portfolio, we selected the stocks of all firms
with a fiscal year ending on December 31 whose Simple q fell within the
lowest quartile of Simple q for these firms as of December 31 for the
prior year. In the second, we constructed an identical portfolio except
that we selected the stocks of all firms whose Simple q fell within the
highest quartile of Simple q as of December 31 for the prior year.180 (For
instance, when forming the January 1, 1989 portfolio, we selected
stocks based on their Simple q for December 31, 1988.) We then

179. See Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note 25.
180. On average, each annual portfolio had approximately nine hundred securities assigned
to it.
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compared how these two annual portfolios fared over the ensuing
twelve months relative to an investor who simply invested in an
S&P 500 index fund on January 1. Figure 1 presents the average
cumulative monthly return differentials between each portfolio and the
S&P 500.
FIGURE 1: CUMULATIVE MONTHLY PORTFOLIO RETURNS
RELATIVE TO MARKET PORTFOLIO

Portfolio Return - Market Return

0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
-0.02

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

-0.04
-0.06
-0.08

Month
Lowest Quartile of Q Stocks

Highest Quartile of Q Stocks

Clearly, an investor who formed these annual portfolios would
have done significantly better by focusing on firms that fell within the
lowest quartile of Simple q during the prior December. On average, the
“low q” portfolio outperformed the S&P 500 by approximately seven
percent by the end of each twelve-month period. In contrast, an investor
who assumed that firms with high Simple q created stockholder value
within a one-year time horizon would have been sorely disappointed.
Indeed, this investor would have consistently underperformed an
investment in the S&P 500.
In Appendix B, we present a more formal analysis utilizing riskadjusted returns and controlling for year- and firm-fixed effects; the
results are consistent with Figure 1.181 In unreported results, we also
find that the inverse relationship between Tobin’s q and returns
persists whether we define Tobin’s q using Simple q or Total q.

181. See infra app. B.
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If these questions, and the above findings, sound familiar to
scholars in law and finance, it is because they are: the finance literature
has demonstrated a robust relationship between a risk factor that
resembles Simple q and future equity returns. Indeed, our results above
are consistent with a widely cited literature in asset pricing, originating
with the pioneering work of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French.182 To
our knowledge, the connection between this literature and Simple q has
not previously been made by researchers who use Simple q as a proxy
for firm value.
In a series of papers, Fama and French showed that by adding
several “risk factors” to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, they could
explain expected returns of U.S. common stocks better than that widely
used model. Most notably for our purposes, they examined the excess
returns of “value” stocks, which they identified as those with a high
book-to-market ratio.183 The Fama and French “HML” (high minus low)
risk factor resembles the reciprocal of Simple q, except that it uses only
the market and book value of equity, not the full capital structure. In
other words, Tobin’s q and HML capture similar phenomena.
More recently within asset pricing, a robust debate has emerged
regarding the reason for this empirical relationship. As is often the case
in asset pricing, the debate generally hinges on the extent to which one
believes markets are subject to behavioral biases. Fama and French,
for instance, initially theorized that if markets are efficient in pricing
stocks, the higher expected returns for “value” stocks indicate that
investors must demand more compensation for investing in these
securities because these securities are more risky (i.e., investors expect
that returns from investing in value stocks will have high volatility).184
Other scholars, however, have theorized that whether a firm is a “value”
stock may reflect market inefficiencies that can affect managers’
investment decisions, which might explain the link between future
returns and HML (and Simple q). For instance, in an influential paper,
Christopher Polk and Paola Sapienza suggest that a firm’s stock price
might be overvalued due to mispricing by equity markets, which
encourages managers to overinvest.185 Empirically, they advance this
182. See, e.g., Fama & French, supra note 22.
183. See id. at 35–40 (finding that stock portfolios formed on the basis of firms’ book-to-market
ratios are systematically related to returns in excess of those predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing
Model).
184. See Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J.
FIN. 427, 428 (1992) (speculating that “[f]irms that the market judges to have poor prospects,
signaled here by low stock prices and high ratios of book-to-market equity, have higher expected
stock returns (they are penalized with higher costs of capital) than firms with strong prospects”).
185. Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test
of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187 (2009).
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argument by constructing a mispricing metric and find that it is
positively related to investment.186 They also find an inverse relation
between capital investment and future equity returns.187 In
combination, they argue that this evidence suggests that overpriced
firms tend to overinvest and underpriced firms tend to underinvest,188
which could also account for the inverse association between q and
equity returns shown in Figure 1.
More recently, Lu Zhang has advanced an alternative
explanation that endogenizes a firm’s investment and its returns.189
According to this “Investment CAPM” theory, the findings documented
by Polk and Sapienza (among others) are entirely consistent with
Tobin’s original theory, and the relatively low expected returns for highq, high-investment firms are what one would expect to see if managers
are in fact optimizing as postulated by Tobin. To understand why,
consider two firms, A and B, that each expect a $1 investment in capital
(net of adjustment costs) to produce $1.20 of future cash flows. If we
observe that only firm A makes the $1 investment, the Investment
CAPM posits that the discount rate for firm A (and therefore, its
expected returns) must be lower than the discount rate for firm B.190
Moreover, if markets are efficient, this will also mean that firm A will
have a higher marginal q than firm B.191 In this fashion, firm A’s higher
investment levels, higher q, and lower expected returns are all
endogenously determined.
To be sure, the Investment CAPM also predicts that highinvestment firms could also be firms that have a high marginal product
of capital because they are simply more efficient. For instance, we would
also observe that firm A invests $1 when firm B does not invest if firm
A and firm B have the same discount rate (i.e., they have the same cost
of capital), but firm A expects to generate greater future cash flows from
an investment of $1 than firm B does. Note, however, that the
Investment CAPM is agnostic as to whether firm A’s greater investment

186. Id. at 190–200.
187. Id. at 204–09.
188. Id. at 212–13.
189. Lu Zhang, The Investment CAPM, 23 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 545, 593 (2017) (“In general
equilibrium, risks, expected returns and characteristics are all endogenously determined
simultaneously.”).
190. For example, the present value of $1.20 received in one year at a discount rate of 20% is
$1.00 (i.e., 1.20 / 1.20); however, using a discount rate of 15% would produce a present value of
approximately $1.04 (i.e., 1.20 / 1.15).
191. Marginal q is simply the ratio of the present value of the marginal benefits of investment
to the marginal cost of investment (net of adjustment costs). Thus, if the present value of the
marginal benefit of a $1 investment by firm A was $1.04 and only $1.00 for firm B, the marginal q
for firm A would be 1.04, while the marginal q of firm B would be 1.00.
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is a function of its marginal productivity of capital or its cost of capital.
Nor does Investment CAPM place any interpretation on what it means
for a firm to have either a low or high cost of capital; in contrast to the
Fama and French model, it does not assume that a firm’s cost of capital
must reflect risk.192
Yuhang Xing further explores empirically the possibility that a
firm’s high q can reflect either a high marginal productivity of capital
or a low cost of capital.193 Xing finds that portfolios of firms with low
investment growth have significantly higher average returns than
portfolios of firms with high investment growth, even after controlling
for the marginal productivity of capital. As Xing summarizes, these
findings indicate that “higher Q and investment are more likely to
result from lower expected returns in the future, rather than from a
high marginal product of capital.”194 Xing further notes that the
evidence suggests that firm-level capital investment is more likely to be
driven by variation in future discount rates than by variation in the
future productivity of its capital.
We are not advocating any particular view: the debate about the
relationship between q, investment, and expected returns is ongoing in
the asset pricing literature, and we will follow it with interest. Our main
contribution here is to show researchers this link between empirical
corporate finance and asset pricing and to highlight the challenge that
this literature poses for scholars who use q as a proxy for firm value.
Put simply, researchers in empirical corporate finance have been using
a proxy for firm value that researchers in asset pricing have been using,
in similar form, for different purposes and with different
interpretations. For some of these researchers, increases in q reflect
market mispricing, which is followed by low returns to equity as the
mispricing dissipates and management overinvests. For others,
increases in q reflect a decrease in the expected volatility of a company’s
stock returns. And for still others, increases in q may very well reflect
stochastic reductions in a firm’s discount rate, not enhanced
profitability. Under all of these theories, stockholders of high-q firms
can be expected to earn low future returns.
It is a puzzle for scholars who sanguinely conclude that a
corporate law change is normatively desirable because it is associated
192. See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 189, at 593 (“I interpret the q-factor model as a parsimonious
description of the cross section of expected returns, not necessarily a risk factor model, and the qfactor loadings as regression slopes, not necessarily measures of some inexplicable sources of
risk.”).
193. Yuhang Xing, Interpreting the Value Effect Through the Q-Theory: An Empirical
Investigation, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1767 (2008).
194. Id. at 1783.
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with a higher measure of Simple q. At minimum, they should engage
with the asset pricing literature’s findings that the book-to-market ratio
is associated with relatively lower returns. We look forward to seeing
how these scholars attempt to resolve this puzzle.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
In the preceding pages we have sought to convince readers that
the common use of Simple q as a proxy for firm value is fundamentally
flawed as a matter of intellectual history, as a matter of logic, and as a
matter of empirics. Here, we conclude by taking stock of the widespread
reliance on this flawed proxy for firm value with respect to both the
state of corporate governance research and, more generally, the current
“replication crisis” in social science.
First and most obviously, the growing use and reliance on
Simple q as a proxy for firm value raises troubling questions about the
large body of empirical scholarship that examines how corporate
governance affects firm value. Indeed, in Appendix C, we conduct a
replication study to examine empirically how the flaws in Simple q can
produce inaccurate empirical findings that have subsequently been
used to draw conclusions about what constitutes “good” versus “bad”
corporate governance. Our findings confirm that the flaws we document
in Simple q can, in fact, lead to inaccurate empirical conclusions.
In our replication study, we focus on reexamining the results of
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell’s seminal paper, What
Matters in Corporate Governance?195 Published in 2008 in the Review of
Financial Studies, the article has been cited over 915 times according
to Web of Science196 and has been downloaded over thirty thousand
times on the Social Science Research Network.197 In their paper,
Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (“BCF”) hypothesize that
governance provisions that “entrench[ ]” management can have
negative implications for firm value.198 To test this hypothesis, BCF
construct an Entrenchment Index—or E-Index—based on four
provisions that materially constrain shareholder influence (staggered
boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority
195. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
196. What Matters in Corporate Governance?, WEB SCI., http://apps.webofknowledge.com/
full_record.do?product=WOS&search_mode=AuthorFinder&qid=21&SID=5DRzNduOmAxJoKH
Mr3p&page=1&doc=3 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V8X7-TYZD].
197. What Matters in Corporate Governance, SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=593423 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4YJH-9WSZ].
198. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 784.
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requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter
amendments) and two that interfere with the market for corporate
control (poison pills and golden parachutes).199 Consistent with their
hypothesis, BCF find that increases in the level of the E-Index are
monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in
firm value as measured by Simple q.200 Moreover, BCF find that, upon
controlling for the presence of entrenching governance provisions, other
governance provisions that had previously been shown to affect Simple
q no longer have any effect.201
In Appendix C, we replicate BCF’s core findings using Simple q,
finding (as did BCF) an inverse relationship between management
entrenchment—as measured by the E-Index—and Simple q. Yet we also
find that if we use the Peters and Taylor Total q as our proxy for firm
value instead of Simple q, the results in BCF disappear: the reduction
in statistical significance is dramatic.202
As noted previously, Total q is an alternative estimate for “true”
Tobin’s q and attempts to include in the denominator of Total q a firm’s
level of intangible property. Peters and Taylor designed this estimate
of Tobin’s q because intangibles are typically omitted from a firm’s book
value of assets, which creates the likelihood that a firm’s Simple q will
be biased upward if it makes large investments in intangibles. The
availability of the Total q dataset therefore allows us to answer a
critical question implicated by BCF’s decision to use Simple q as a proxy
for firm value: if firms with low levels of the E-Index have high levels of
intangibles, could this mean that the BCF finding was simply an
artifact of bias in Simple q?
As we show in Appendix C, our replication of the BCF study
confirms that this is in fact the case for BCF’s central, causal finding.
Firms having high levels of unbooked intangibles (as estimated in the
Peters and Taylor dataset) have low levels of the E-Index. Moreover,
simply substituting Total q for Simple q in the fixed-effects regression
framework used by BCF shows that Total q has no statistically
meaningful relationship with a firm’s level of the E-Index.
By itself, our replication analysis has considerable implications
for the current state of corporate governance research. For one, BCF’s
empirical finding of a negative association between the E-Index and
firm value has significantly informed how institutional investors decide
what constitutes “good” and “bad” corporate governance in voting at
199. See id. at 784–85.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 821–23.
202. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text (discussing the modified calculations of
Peters and Taylor).
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shareholder elections.203 For another, the governance index developed
in the paper—the Entrenchment Index—is today a standard regressor
in corporate governance research with over three hundred studies
utilizing it.204 Yet, as with shareholders citing BCF when forming
governance voting polices, the primary rationale for relying on the BCF
paper stems from its empirical findings that the E-Index can affect firm
value—a finding that turns out to be highly dependent on the particular
proxy that they use for Tobin’s q.
Additionally, BCF’s paper helped usher in a wave of studies
adopting the same methodology to investigate the relationship between
Simple q and various corporate governance characteristics. Today the
BCF empirical framework of regressing Simple q on a governance
provision of interest is the standard empirical framework for examining
how any number of corporate characteristics can affect firm value. This
is true both with respect to studies examining U.S. firms, as well as
with respect to international studies designed to inform policy. Most
notably, these studies have been especially influential in shaping how
scholars and policymakers evaluate the relative merits of various
corporate governance regimes, particularly within emerging markets.
Many explicitly adopt the framework utilized by BCF insofar that they
examine how various governance and firm characteristics predict levels
of Simple q.205 In light of our replication study of BCF, we can only
203. For instance, two of the largest public pension funds—CalSTERS and CalPERS—have
expressly cited the study as the basis for multiple declassification proposals submitted to publicly
traded companies. See, e.g., Titan International, Inc., Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form
PX14A6G)
(May
18,
2015),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1081019/
000092189515001407/px14a6g00322tii_05182015.htm
[https://perma.cc/QW3J-VLDN]
(“A
staggered board has been found to be one of six entrenching mechanisms that are negatively
correlated with company performance, see “What Matters in Corporate Governance?” Lucian
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 491 (09/2004,
revised 04/2009)”); Letter from Charles E. Baker, Vice President & General Counsel, Ball Corp.,
to Office of Chief Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Ex. A (Dec. 21, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2010/calpers012510-14a8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2SQE-8Q64] (shareholder proposal submitted by CalPERS citing the same).
Companies have likewise cited the study in their own proposals for board declassification. See, e.g.,
Rofin-Sinar Technologies, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at 16 (Schedule 14A) (Feb. 23, 2016) https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1019361/000156761916001859/s001156x10_defn14a.htm
[https://perma.cc/EW7Z-JXMX] (citing BCF as support for an advisory vote to declassify the
company’s board of directors).
204. See Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell Applied by More Than 300
Research Papers, HARV. L. TODAY, (June 11, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/more-than-300research-papers-have-applied-the-entrenchment-index-of-bebchuk-cohen-and-ferrell/
[https://perma.cc/7CUW-QWTR] (remarking on the paper’s circulation and influence).
205. See, e.g., Marcus V. Braga-Alves & Kuldeep Shastri, Corporate Governance, Valuation,
and Performance: Evidence from a Voluntary Market Reform in Brazil, 40 FIN. MGMT. 139 (2011)
(analyzing whether corporate governance efforts were significantly related to firm value and
operating performance using Simple q); Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Does Corporate Governance
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suspect that the many studies that follow BCF in using Simple q as a
proxy for firm value likewise suffer from the bias arising from using
Simple q as an outcome variable.
Finally, our critique of BCF, combined with the history of Tobin’s
q described in Part II, contributes to the “replication crisis” debate in
social science generally. Over the past several years, researchers across
a range of disciplines have been unable to replicate a number of notable
empirical findings due to both intentional data falsification as well as
selective reporting of data and statistical tests.206 The crisis has been
especially prominent in the field of psychology where data from a large
ongoing replication project has revealed a surprisingly high percentage
of prior studies that cannot be replicated.207 Related efforts have sought
to ensure the replicability of future findings by, among other things,
requiring the preregistration of research hypotheses and modifying the
procedures for determining statistical significance.208
We add two important new elements to the broader academic
debate about replication. First, we demonstrate the importance of close
historical analysis, beyond a simple literature review, particularly to
ensure that scholars understand how the constructs they are examining
have changed over time. By the 1990s, the original story of Tobin’s q
played little role in scholars’ decisions to adopt Simple q as a proxy for
Predict Future Performance? Evidence from Hong Kong, 40 FIN. MGMT. 159 (2011) (examining the
relation between changes in the quality of corporate governance practices and subsequent market
valuation among large listed companies in Hong Kong using Simple q); Beverley Jackling &
Shireenjit Johl, Board Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from India’s Top Companies, 17
CORP. GOVERNANCE 492 (2009) (analyzing the relationship between internal governance
structures and financial performance using Simple q); Jonchi Shyu, Family Ownership and Firm
Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese Firms, 7 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 397 (2011) (using
Simple q as a valuation indicator to analyze the effect of family ownership on firm performance);
Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Ultimate Government Control Structure and Fair Value: Evidence from
Chinese Listed Companies, 2 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 13 (2009) (examining the impact of government
control structures on firm value of Chinese companies using Simple q); Lijun Xia, Founder Control,
Ownership Structure and Firm Value: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Listed Firms in China, 1
CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 31 (2009) (investigating the effect of the deviation between the controlling
shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights on firm value using Simple q).
206. For a summary, see Rotello et al., supra note 24.
207. See id. (discussing the problems of replication and misinterpretation plaguing
psychological studies); see also Effort to Estimate the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,
supra note 24 (describing a large-scale replication project within psychology).
208. See Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology:
Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant,
22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359 (2011) (providing four guidelines for researchers in psychology to reduce
the risk of false-positive findings); Joseph E. Gonzales & Corbin A. Cunningham, The Promise of
Pre-Registration in Psychological Research, PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA (Aug. 2015),
https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2015/08/pre-registration
[https://perma.cc/647S-YJXM]
(describing journals where researchers either have the option or are required to submit their
research rationale, hypotheses, design and analytic strategy to the journal for peer review before
beginning the study).
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Tobin’s q. Scholars who do not focus on the historical origin of the
constructs they are testing risk repeating the kinds of errors associated
with Simple q. We caution academics to be especially wary of constructs
that have acquired technical labels, including the names of prominent
scholars, but whose meaning has strayed from the original concept.
Second, we show that it is important not only to replicate past
studies, but to validate them. Our replication of BCF’s study highlights
how the inability to replicate a study is just one way in which empirical
analysis can fail. We were able to replicate BCF’s findings. However,
we also showed that the statistical significance of BCF’s replicated
findings disappears when we use an alternative dependent variable
that arguably corrects some (but not all) of the flaws in BCF’s
dependent variable. In other words, the replication problem we have
identified in corporate governance scholarship goes beyond the
reliability problem that has been demonstrated in the social sciences:
we raise questions about the validity of studies that use Simple q.
Validity and reliability are core principles of the scientific
method, and both are required in evaluating the accuracy of an
empirical test.209 In general, the validity of a scientific test is the extent
to which “it measures what it purports to measure.”210 Reliability, on
the other hand, is a term used to describe the consistency or stability of
test results. As an illustration of these concepts, consider a scale that
consistently mismeasures the weight of an individual by subtracting
ten pounds from the individual’s true weight. Such a scale would be
reliable insofar that repeated attempts to weigh the same group of
individuals would result in similar findings. But the scale itself would
lack validity as a measure for these individuals’ true weight.
Moreover, knowledge of the scale’s history could be crucial.
Suppose the scale became progressively less accurate each year (just as
a financial variable that omitted intangible assets might become
progressively less accurate over time, as intangible assets increase). A
person who observes a declining value on the scale over the course of a
decade might incorrectly assume they have lost weight, just as a scholar
might make incorrect assumptions about changes in Simple q.
Identifying the story of Tobin’s q as an issue of validity rather
than reliability helps explain the persistent use of Simple q while
highlighting how current efforts to address the “replication crisis” are
209. Indeed, these concepts are central to evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony. See
David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: Considerations Following Daubert,
Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199 (2003) (explaining the principles of validity and
reliability, particularly as applied to the forensic use of psychological evaluation, and discussing
recent precedent expounding these precepts).
210. MARY J. ALLEN & WENDY M. YEN, INTRODUCTION TO MEASUREMENT THEORY 113 (2001).
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largely ill-equipped to address empirical problems arising from the use
of invalid measures.211 Most notably, efforts designed to ensure greater
empirical reliability—e.g., publicly sharing datasets, preregistering
hypotheses, adjusting significance tests—do little to dislodge the use of
invalid measures, such as Simple q. On the contrary, as more and more
researchers adopt an invalid measure either to replicate results or
reinterpret prior results, the very emphasis on reliability can have the
pernicious effect of entrenching the use of the measure. Indeed, within
psychology, Caren Rotello, Evan Heit, and Chad Dubé note that the
problem of using invalid measures may be more troubling than the
problem of failing to replicate empirical findings based on those
measures. As they note,
This problem—of dramatically and consistently “getting it wrong”—is potentially a bigger
problem for psychologists than the replication crisis, because the errors can easily go
undetected for long periods of time. The probability of self-correction is low, even if ever
larger numbers of researchers work on these same (and similar) problems . . . Nor is peer
review likely to provide a solution: Once an effect is “established,” it may become
challenging to persuade reviewers that the data should be analyzed differently.212

As this paper shows, a similar conclusion can also be drawn about the
use of Simple q.
In the absence of clear statistical solutions to the problem of
invalid measures, Rotello, Heit, and Dubé conclude that addressing the
problem ultimately requires “scientific discipline.”213 As they elaborate,
“It requires careful attention to the details of [dependent variables],
thorough awareness of their assumptions, and deliberate testing of
their validity.”214 Drawing on both intellectual history and empirical
methods, the approach we have taken aims to provide precisely this
type of analysis of Simple q, revealing it to underperform on all fronts.
At the same time, we hope our critique will encourage scholars to
explore using more direct measures of firm value rather than an invalid
measure such as Simple q.
Of course, only time will tell whether our critique will be
sufficient to alter the current state of corporate governance research.
Meanwhile, we hope to instill among law and finance scholars a healthy
skepticism about relying on the prevailing methodological orthodoxy.

211.
212.
213.
214.

See Rotello et al., supra note 24, at 944.
Id. at 950–51.
Id. at 951.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Many of the most important findings in corporate law
scholarship are based on studies that rely on a modified version of a
firm’s market-to-book ratio. Although these studies call this ratio
“Tobin’s q,” the difference between it—what we call “Simple q”—and
Tobin’s q as originally defined are significant. Because Simple q is a
ratio based on a firm’s book value of assets, studies that use Simple q
are likely to produce biased estimates due to both omitted assets (e.g.,
intangibles) and firm-specific details that can systematically alter
Simple q (e.g., the level of current assets, depreciation, and so on). As a
result, scholars should view with suspicion any assertions about
corporate law or corporate characteristics that are based on Simple q.
Given the importance of understanding how corporate law and
governance can affect the value of a corporation’s securities, we hope to
inspire a broader conversation about the challenge of measuring firm
value. Until scholars find a more reliable way to assess the relationship
between corporate governance and firm value, they should stop relying
on Simple q, or market-to-book, a measure that masquerades as Tobin’s
q, but is not.
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APPENDIX A: CURRENT ASSETS AND INTANGIBLES
Table A.1 presents our test of the relationship between current
assets and Simple q. We calculate Simple q for all nonfinancial
Compustat firms between 1990 and 2010 as of the end of each firm’s
fiscal year. 215 For each firm, we also determine the fraction of the firm’s
total book value of assets that consists of current assets for that fiscal
year. We present the results of two regressions in which we regress a
firm’s Simple q on this ratio (% Current Assets) for the same year. We
also include as a covariate the inverse of a firm’s book value to avoid
the risk of spurious correlation on account of the presence of book value
in both the denominator of Simple q and % Current Assets.216 In Column
1, we conduct the regression controlling for industry- and year-fixed
effects (with robust standard errors clustered by firm); in Column 2, we
control for firm- and year-fixed effects.217
TABLE A.1: CURRENT ASSETS AND SIMPLE Q
(1)

(2)

% Current Assets

2.617***
[0.393]

2.748***
[0.236]

1 / (Book Value)

0.508***
[0.181]

0.278***
[0.016]

Industry FE
Y
Firm FE
N
Year FE
Y
N
106,856
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

N
Y
Y
106,856

As shown in both columns, a firm’s level of current assets is
positively associated with a firm’s Simple q even after controlling for
industry- and firm-fixed effects. Overall, these regression estimates are
consistent with the market attributing a higher q-ratio to current
assets.
Table A.2 illustrates the association between a firm’s intangible
assets and Simple q. As in Table A.1, we calculate Simple q for all
215. We exclude firms having a Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) code between 6,000
and 7,000.
216. The necessity for including this covariate is discussed in Bartlett & Partnoy, supra note
25; and Kronmal, supra note 143, at 381–84.
217. We use 2-digit SIC codes to control for industry fixed effects.
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nonfinancial Compustat firms between 1990 and 2010 as of the end of
each firm’s fiscal year.218 For each firm i, we calculate the percentage of
a company’s assets (% Intangiblesi,t) in fiscal year t that consists of
intangible assets that are unrecorded in book value.219 As in Table A.1,
we present the results of two regressions in which we regress a firm’s
Simple q on this ratio (% Intangibles) for the same year, along with the
inverse of a firm’s book value. In Column 1, we conduct the regression
controlling for industry- and year-fixed effects (with robust standard
errors clustered by firm); in Column 2, we control for firm- and yearfixed effects.
TABLE A.2: INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND SIMPLE Q
(1)

(2)

% Intangibles

3.982***
[0.673]

4.430**
[2.185]

1 / (Book Value)

0.506***
[0.182]

0.277***
[0.020]

Industry FE
Y
Firm FE
N
Year FE
Y
N
133,745
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

N
Y
Y
133,745

Column 1 shows that firms with large unbooked intangible
assets have larger estimates of Simple q. Column 2 confirms this result
even after controlling for firm-fixed effects.

218. As above, we exclude firms having an SIC code between 6,000 and 7,000; we similarly use
two-digit SIC codes when controlling for industry-fixed effects.
219. Estimates of unbooked intangibles for individual firms are obtained from the Total q
dataset created by Peters and Taylor. See Peters & Taylor, supra note 20, at 258 tbl.1 (providing
summary statistics). The dataset is available through WHARTON RES. DATA SERVS., supra note
178.
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APPENDIX B: SIMPLE Q AND CUMULATIVE ANNUAL RETURNS
In Table B.1, we present several empirical analyses of the
relationship between shareholder returns and Simple q. In all analyses
we use the monthly stock file at CRSP to estimate the cumulative oneyear return for every security in CRSP between 1980 and 2010 as a
function of the security’s Simple q as of the beginning of each calendar
year. As in Appendix A, we exclude firms having Standard Industrial
Classification (“SIC”) codes between 6,000 and 7,000. In Columns 1 and
2, we estimate this relationship using a security’s gross cumulative
annual return over year t. Our outcome variable of interest is the oneyear buy-and-hold return from investing in each security i at the
beginning of year t, as a function of the firm’s Simple q as of the
beginning of year t. We then conduct two regressions. In the first
(Column 1), we regress this return on the natural log of the security’s
measure for Simple q as of the beginning of year t. In the second
(Column 2), we regress this annual return on whether the security’s
Simple q fell within the first, second, third, or fourth quartile of all
estimates of Simple q as of the beginning of year t. In both cases, we
also control for year- and firm-fixed effects.
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, a security’s Simple q is inversely
related to the security’s subsequent returns in both models. In Columns
3 and 4, we conduct the same analysis but rather than using a security’s
gross annual return, we use as our dependent variable the security’s
risk-adjusted cumulative annual return for the same time period. We
calculate this last measure using the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor
model, in which we estimate factor coefficients for each security i for
year t using the security’s monthly return data for the twenty-fourmonth period prior to and including December of year t-1. Using
monthly returns for year t, we calculate monthly risk-adjusted returns
as a security’s actual return less the return predicted from the fourfactor model, which we use to construct the cumulative risk-adjusted
return over year t. Regardless of whether we examine gross returns or
risk-adjusted returns, Simple q remains inversely associated with a
security’s subsequent annual returns.220

220. The results of Table B.1 remain unchanged if we estimate these regressions using the
Fama-MacBeth procedure rather than firm- and time-fixed effects. See Eugene F. Fama and James
D. MacBeth, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607 (1973) (using
the two-parameter portfolio model to evaluate the connection between average return and risk of
NYSE common stocks).
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TABLE B.1: RETURNS AND SIMPLE Q
(1)
Annual
Gross
Return
Ln(q)

(2)
Annual
Gross
Return

-0.323***
[.0432]

-0.172***
[0.0286]
Third Quartile of q
-0.290***
[0.0413]
Fourth Quartile of q
-0.458***
[0.0679]
Firm FE
Y
Y
Year FE
Y
Y
N
177,191
177,191
Robust standard errors (clustered by year) in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

(3)
RiskAdjusted
Return

(4)
RiskAdjusted
Return

-0.633***
[.0551]

Second Quartile of q

Y
Y
177,191

-0.246***
[0.0167]
- 0.480***
[0.0269]
-0.898***
[0.0502]
Y
Y
177,191
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APPENDIX C: BCF REPLICATION STUDY
We present in this Appendix our replication study of What
Matters in Corporate Governance?, a widely cited paper by Lucian
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell (“BCF”),221 which was
published in 2009 in the Review of Financial Studies. In addition to
being highly influential within both the academy and industry, this
paper was an ideal choice for two primary reasons. First, because BCF
publicly provide much of their core dataset on Lucian Bebchuk’s
website, it is possible for us to replicate their study. Unfortunately, a
large number of papers in empirical finance use hand-collected datasets
that are not available to other researchers. Second, because BCF use
Simple q as a proxy for Tobin’s q, it is straightforward to compare their
results with results that arise when one uses a different proxy for
Tobin’s q. Most notably, we focus on the measure of Total q developed
by Peters and Taylor and discussed in the main text. As noted
previously, this alternative measure of q attempts to address
specifically the measurement error in Simple q arising from the
omission of intangibles in book value. Accordingly, we can use Total q
to examine how this well-known aspect of measurement error in Simple
q might have biased prior findings.
BCF built on a seminal study published in 2003 by Paul
Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick (“GIM”), entitled Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices.222 In their study, GIM constructed a
“Governance Index” based on twenty-four governance provisions
tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC”) to
proxy for the level of shareholder rights at 1,500 large firms during the
1990s.223 GIM investigated returns from investing in “good
governance,” an investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest
decile of the index (strong shareholder rights) and sold firms in the
highest decile of the index (weak shareholder rights).224 Remarkably,
the study reported that this strategy would have earned abnormal
returns of 8.5 percent per year from 1990 through 1999.225
BCF hypothesized that only a subset of these provisions truly
matter to investors, with those that “entrench” management being the
most significant.226 Accordingly, they constructed an Entrenchment
Index—or E-Index—based on four IRRC provisions that materially
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
See Gompers et al., supra note 5.
See id. at 114–19 (describing the Governance Index).
See id. at 144–45 (describing the study’s conclusions).
Id. at 144.
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 785.
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constrain shareholder influence (staggered boards, limits to
shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for
mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments) and
two that interfere with the market for corporate control (poison pills
and golden parachutes).227
BCF found that increases in the level of the E-Index were
monotonically associated with economically significant reductions in
firm value as measured by Simple q.228 Using the same framework as
GIM, they also found that pursuing the same long-short investment
strategy but focusing on buying firms with the lowest E-Index and
shorting firms with the highest E-Index would have produced abnormal
monthly returns of 116 basis points per month during the 1990s.229 In
contrast, the other eighteen IRRC provisions not in the entrenchment
index were uncorrelated with either Simple q or abnormal returns.230
BCF’s finding that the results from GIM were driven primarily by the
six entrenchment provisions made the paper highly influential in the
corporate governance literature.231
To the extent BCF sought to advance the more ambitious claim
that high entrenchment actually results in lower firm value or
abnormal returns, BCF were more cautious given the largely
correlational nature of their analyses. The paper concluded by noting:
“We present some evidence that is consistent with the possibility that,
in the aggregate, the entrenching provisions bring about or help
maintain lower firm valuation. But this evidence does not establish
causality and much more work needs to be done.”232
The evidence that BCF found with respect to a possible causal
relationship focused primarily on the fact that many of the firms within
their sample altered their E-Index over time.233 Accordingly, by
exploiting the panel structure of the data, they examined how variation
in the E-Index was associated with changes in Simple q, which revealed
a negative relationship.234 Describing this finding as “consistent” with
a causal relationship, they tentatively noted: “[T]o the extent that the
identified correlation between the provisions in our E index and firm
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 815.
230. See id. at 816 tbl.10 (showcasing the monthly abnormal returns for the different E-Index
portfolios).
231. See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text.
232. Id. at 823.
233. See id. at 803 (“[T]here was meaningful variation in the incidence of some entrenching
provisions over the 1990–2003 period, such as golden parachutes and limits on shareholders’
ability to amend bylaws, that would result in changes in firms’ entrenchment scores.”).
234. See id.
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value at least partly reflects a causal relation going from entrenchment
to firm value, these provisions are ones that deserve the attention of
private and public decision makers seeking to improve corporate
governance.”235 Despite this qualified approach, the paper’s widely cited
findings nevertheless helped usher in a wave of studies examining the
relationship between q and various corporate governance
characteristics.
We begin our analysis by first investigating the extent to which
the E-Index is correlated with measurement error in Simple q, or qs.
Because we are interested in examining the consequences of
measurement error in Tobin’s q, we make the strong (and unrealistic)
assumption that Total q (qTotal) represents the “true” value of q. To the
extent this were actually the case, Simple q would therefore contain
multiplicative measurement error, 𝜑 , as follows:236
𝑞

= 𝑞 𝜑

We test empirically whether this measurement error in Simple q
is correlated with the E-Index. All analyses are conducted on the same
sample of firms used by BCF, which we obtain from Lucian Bebchuk’s
website.237 For each firm, the file lists by year its corresponding E-Index
/𝑞 . In Column
value, and we calculate 𝜑 for each observation as 𝑞
1 of Table C.1, we present coefficient estimates of a simple regression of
the natural log of 𝜑 on E-indexit, including industry- and year-fixed
effects.

235. Id. at 785, 787.
236. As noted in Part II, both the numerator of Simple q (denoted here as 𝑀𝑉 ∗ ) and its
denominator (denoted here as 𝐵𝑉 ∗ ) mismeasure the true numerator and denominator of Tobin’s q.
See supra notes 146–162 (discussing evidence of measurement error in q calculations). If these
true values are denoted MV and RV, respectively, we can express the relationship between “true”
q and Simple q as follows:
𝑀𝑉 ∗ (𝐵𝑉 ∗ )(𝑀𝑉)
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑞 =
𝑥
𝐵𝑉 ∗ (𝑀𝑉 ∗ )(𝑅𝑉)
Thus, measurement error in Simple q is multiplicative, as reflected by the need to multiply Simple
( ∗ )(
)
( ∗ )(
)
to transform Simple q into True q. We represent
by the variable 𝜑 .
q by
∗
∗
(

)(

)

237. The dataset can be downloaded at the
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml
[https://perma.cc/5GLR-V73P].

(

)(

)

following link. Data, HARV. L.,
(last
updated
Feb.
2020)
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TABLE C.1: MEASUREMENT ERROR AND THE E-INDEX
(1)
Ln(𝜑 )
-0.063***
(0.015)

(s)
Intangiblesit
DV
E-Index
-129.268***
(49.083)
Book Value
0.019**
(0.008)
273.304***
Constant
-0.587***
(0.034)
(96.433)
Year-Fixed Effects
Y
Y
Industry-Fixed Effects
Y
Y
N
14,658
17,823
R-squared
0.265
0.169
Robust standard errors (clustered by industry) in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Column 1 of Table C.1 presents the coefficient estimate. As
shown in the table, the coefficient of -0.063 has a standard error of
0.015, indicating a negative association between 𝜑 and the E-Index. In
Column 2, we examine whether the E-Index is associated with different
levels of unbooked intangibles. For each firm i, we obtain Intangiblesi,t,
defined as the level of unbooked intangibles reported in the Peters and
Taylor dataset at Wharton Research Data Services (“WRDS”), for each
firm year and similarly regress it on E-Indexit, including industry- and
year-fixed effects as well as a control for a firm’s book value in year t.
The coefficient of -141.658 is statistically significant. These latter
results suggest that the negative correlation of 𝜑 and the E-Index is
driven in part by the fact that firms having lower E-Index scores have
a greater percentage of their assets in the form of unbooked intangibles.
Next, we replicate BCF’s core finding regarding entrenchment
and Tobin’s q, which they estimate by using Simple q. As reflected in
Table C.1, all analyses are conducted on the same sample of firms used
by BCF. We present the results of this replication in the first two
columns of Table C.2.
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TABLE C.2:
REPLICATION OF BCF USING SIMPLE Q AND TOTAL Q—
POOLED REGRESSIONS
E-Index

(1)
-0.118***
[0.00814]

E-Index 1

0.00908*
[0.00508]
-0.0261***
[0.00869]
-0.128***
[0.0156]

0.00996
[0.0153]
0.346***
[0.0327]
-0.777***
[0.0523]

0.00599
[0.0214]

0.00694
[0.0214]

-0.205***
[0.0679]

-0.210***
[0.0680]

0.438
[0.337]

0.377
[0.338]

5.965***
[1.024]

5.855***
[1.028]

-1.125
[0.731]
1.686***
[0.220]
1.637***
[0.203]
-0.712***
[0.0935]
0.0208***
[0.00632]

-1.03
[0.734]
1.687***
[0.219]
1.653***
[0.203]
-0.719***
[0.0936]
0.0209***
[0.00637]

-9.770***
[1.869]
2.832***
[0.328]
-8.941***
[0.633]
-1.475***
[0.271]
0.0291***
[0.00688]

-9.603***
[1.874]
2.831***
[0.326]
-8.946***
[0.634]
-1.483***
[0.272]
0.0291***
[0.00697]

E-Index 4
E-Index 5-6

Log[Age]
Delaware
Incorporation
Insider
Ownership
Insider
Ownership
Squared
ROA
CAPX/Assets
Leverage
R&D per Sales

(4)

-0.362**
[0.158]
-0.597***
[0.148]
-0.714***
[0.146]
-1.110***
[0.148]
-1.014***
[0.198]
0.0103
[0.0154]
0.344***
[0.0326]
-0.773***
[0.0523]

E-Index 3

Log[Assets]

(3)
-0.225***
[0.0258]

-0.278***
[0.0520]
-0.350***
[0.0488]
-0.452***
[0.0485]
-0.555***
[0.0486]
-0.687***
[0.0556]
0.00949*
[0.00510]
-0.0286***
[0.00878]
-0.128***
[0.0156]

E-Index 2

O-Index

(2)

Year-Fixed
Effects
Y
Firm-Fixed
Effects
N
Number of
Observations
11,336
R-squared
0.138
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

11,336
0.139

11,336
0.098

11,336
0.098

As in the BCF study, Column 1 presents the results of a pooled
OLS regression for their sample firms for the 1992–2002 period.
Following their original specification, we regress the industry-adjusted
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Simple q for firm i in year t on the firm’s E-index score for that year,
holding constant a variety of variables. Consistent with BCF, we define
a firm’s industry-adjusted Simple q as a firm’s Simple q minus the
median Simple q in the firm’s industry in the observation year (using
two-digit SIC codes). Due to the existence of outliers, we winsorize this
measure at one percent. We note that this differs slightly from the
approach of BCF, who use as their dependent variable the log of a firm’s
industry-adjusted Simple q. We use winsorized, nontransformed
industry-adjusted Simple q for two reasons. First, industry-adjusted
Simple q can yield negative values, and BCF do not describe how they
conducted their log transformation given the presence of these negative
measures. Second, BCF report obtaining the same results using
nontransformed industry-adjusted Simple q.
In all regressions in Table C.2, including the regression in
Column 1, we include the same controls used in BCF, which include the
assets of the firm (in logs), the age of the firm (in logs), whether the firm
is incorporated in Delaware (0/1), the level of insider ownership (and its
squared value), return on assets, capital expenditures (scaled by total
assets), research and development (“R&D”) expenditures (scaled by
sales), and leverage. In keeping with BCF’s approach, we also include
as a control a firm’s “O Index,” which they define as a firm’s IRRC
provisions (reported by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick)238 minus its EIndex value. BCF include this latter variable to estimate how well the
E-Index predicts firm outcomes relative to the other governance
provisions tracked by IRRC. Finally, we include year-fixed effects and
a dummy variable for missing R&D expenditures, also consistent with
BCF.239 As with BCF, we use robust standard errors to account for
potential heteroskedasticity.
In Column 1, the coefficient on the E-Index is significantly
negative, consistent with the findings of BCF. In Column 2, we further
confirm the findings of BCF when we regress industry-adjusted Simple
q on dummy variables that represent the different levels that the EIndex can take. As noted by BCF, this latter specification avoids the
imposition of linearity on the E-Index’s relationship with industryadjusted Simple q. The results in Column 2 track those of BCF closely,
with each level of the E-Index having an increasingly negative
association with industry-adjusted Simple q. Moreover, across all six
levels of the index, the results are significant at the one percent level.
238. See Gompers et al., supra note 5.
239. BCF appear to use a dummy for missing variables for R&D given the large number of
observations for which R&D expenditures are missing. BCF do not specify how they implement
this dummy variable substitution; therefore, we do so by substituting the median value of observed
R&D values for missing R&D values and dummy code these observations as “missing R&D.”
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Similar to BCF, the coefficient on the O-Index is positive and significant
in both columns, though only at the ten percent level.
In the third and fourth columns, we re-run each of these
specifications using industry-adjusted Total q rather than industryadjusted Simple q. As with calculating industry-adjusted Simple q, we
define a firm’s industry-adjusted Total q as a firm’s Total q (as reported
in the Peters and Taylor dataset) minus the median Total q in the firm’s
industry in the observation year (using two-digit SIC codes). As with
industry-adjusted Simple q, we winsorize the measure at one percent.
As shown in Columns 3 and 4, the results are strikingly similar to those
obtained in Columns 1 and 2. The primary exception is that the
negative coefficient on E-Index 5-6 is slightly less negative than the
coefficient on E-Index 4. The positive coefficient on the O-Index is also
no longer statistically significant at conventional levels.
Overall, Table C.2 suggests that BCF’s original finding that
firms with high E-Index values are associated with lower Tobin’s q
persists regardless of whether we define Tobin’s q using Simple q or
Total q. However, as emphasized by BCF, these cross-sectional
regressions do not speak to their more provocative suggestion that
changes in a firm’s E-Index can cause changes in firm value. To get at
this latter issue, BCF ran an additional set of specifications using firmfixed effects to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity that remains
constant over their sample period.240 By holding constant firm-fixed
effects, these regressions put them on a firmer footing for examining
how changes in the E-Index over time at a firm might affect its industryadjusted Simple q. As they note, “The fixed effects
regressions . . . examine the effect on firm value of changes that firms
made, during the 1990–2003 period, in the number of entrenching
provisions (whether to increase or decrease the number of entrenching
provisions).”241
In Table C.3, we use both BCF’s measure of industry-adjusted
Simple q and industry-adjusted Total q as our outcome variables. The
first two columns use industry-adjusted Simple q and replicate the
results obtained by BCF. Specifically, in Column 1, the coefficient on
the E-Index is negative and significant at the one percent level, and the
coefficient on the O-Index is now insignificant. Overall, these results
are virtually the same as those obtained by BCF.

240. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 803.
241. Id.
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TABLE C.3:
REPLICATION OF BCF USING SIMPLE Q AND TOTAL Q—
CONTROLLING FOR FIRM-FIXED EFFECTS
E-Index

(1)
-0.0450***
[0.0148]

E-Index 1
E-Index 2
E-Index 3
E-Index 4
E-Index 5-6
O-Index
Log[Assets]
Log[Age]
Delaware
Incorporation
Insider
Ownership
Insider
Ownership
Squared
ROA
CAPX / Assets
Leverage
R&D per Sales

0.00604
[0.00439]
-0.319***
[0.0327]
-0.177**
[0.0694]
-

(2)

-0.0872*
[0.0494]
-0.0846
[0.0537]
-0.164***
[0.0589]
-0.211***
[0.0647]
-0.203***
[0.0724]
0.00599
[0.00439]
-0.318***
[0.0327]
-0.178***
[0.0692]
-

(3)
-0.0479
[0.0454]

0.0388***
[0.0115]
0.00333
[0.0998]
-1.300***
[0.185]
-

(4)

-0.136
[0.119]
-0.0569
[0.132]
-0.109
[0.151]
-0.256
[0.183]
-0.255
[0.356]
0.0390***
[0.0115]
0.005
[0.0997]
-1.309***
[0.186]
-

1.370***
[0.418]

1.374***
[0.420]

1.453
[1.200]

1.463
[1.208]

-1.409**
[0.708]
1.118***
[0.179]
1.697***
[0.270]
-0.407***
[0.138]
0.00622
[0.00493]

-1.412**
[0.708]
1.117***
[0.179]
1.699***
[0.270]
-0.409***
[0.138]
0.00623
[0.00493]

-1.072
[1.706]
2.278***
[0.318]
0.274
[0.536]
0.061
[0.295]
0.0121***
[0.00264]

-1.076
[1.714]
2.275***
[0.318]
0.275
[0.537]
0.0536
[0.295]
0.0121***
[0.00266]

Year-Fixed
Effects
Y
Y
Firm-Fixed
Effects
Y
Y
Observations
11,336
11,336
R-squared
0.734
0.734
Robust standard errors in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Y

Y

Y
11,336
0.772

Y
11,336
0.772

In Column 2, we further follow BCF in exploring whether higher
values of the E-Index are more predictive of declining values of
industry-adjusted Simple q, holding constant firm-fixed effects.
Consistent with BCF, the coefficients grow increasingly negative
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between E-Index 1 through E-Index 5-6, although only the last three
levels of the E-Index achieve the same level of statistical significance as
in the BCF paper. Overall, however, one could draw a similar conclusion
as BCF in interpreting these findings as suggesting that higher levels
of entrenchment cause a decline in industry-adjusted Simple q.
Moreover, the absence of any significant coefficient on the O-Index
suggests that the mechanism by which corporate governance might
affect Simple q would be through the E-Index as opposed to the G-Index.
In contrast, as shown in Columns 3 and 4, the same cannot be
said of the relationship between the E-Index and industry-adjusted
Total q. In both Columns 3 and 4, the coefficients on the E-Index have
lost all statistical significance. More importantly, the coefficient on the
O-Index is positive and significant at the one percent level. In other
words, BCF’s main results do not hold if we simply substitute Total q
for Simple q.
These results underscore how failure to account for
measurement error in a ratio that is used as an outcome variable can
lead to biased regression estimates. Additionally, note that BCF
included R&D as a control variable, but the addition of this variable
was insufficient to control for the fact that Simple q omitted a firm’s
investment in intangible assets.
Of course, Total q is not necessarily an appropriate substitute
for Tobin’s q generally, or even a defensible substitute for Simple q.
Among other things, for instance, it continues to rely on the book values
of PPE, which are recorded at cost and subject to depreciation. Total q
also reflects the capitalization of R&D as well as a fixed thirty percent
measure of selling, general, and administrative expenses, both of which
are unlikely to be associated with actual replacement costs. The ratio of
the denominator of Total q to replacement costs is unlikely to be
straightforward. But our point is not to advocate on behalf of Total q;
rather it is to illustrate that there are good reasons to believe
measurement error in a ratio that is an outcome variable can easily bias
results, even when a researcher includes proxies for this measurement
error as a covariate.

